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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Section I. GENERAL
1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual sets forth doctrine and establi~hes

procedures for the management, planmng, collection, production, reporting, and
dissemination of Army technical intelligence.
The manual is applicable to both nuclear and
nonnuclear warfare. It covers procedures and
establishes broad principles regarding the role
of military intelligence personnel and units in
technical intelligence, and provides guidance
for commanders, staffs, and combat support
personnel in technical intelligence matters.
b. Users of this manual are encouraged to
submit recommended changes or comments to
improve the manual. Comments should be
keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line
of text in which the change is recommended.
Reasons should be provided for each comment
to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Whenever possible, comments should be
prepared on DA Form 1598 and forwarded
direct to the Commanding Officer, US Army
Combat Developments Command Intelligence
Agency, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219.

2. Definitions

a. For definition of terms used see AR 320-5.
b. The relationship of intelligence and technical intelligence is set forth below.
(1) Intelligence is the product resulting
from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of
all information concerning one or
more aspects of foreign countries or
areas which are immediately or potentially significant to the development
and execution of military plans, policies, and operations. Intelligence conAGO 5590A

sists of evaluated information and
conclusions which the tactical commander, staff officers, and strategic
planners require on a continual basis
to determine enemy probable courses
of action. Intelligence production is a
completely integrated effort and no
one phase of intelligence must ever be
considered to be the sole intelligence
system. Each aspect and level of military intelligence, to include technical
intelligence, plays a vital role in the
final tactical, theater, and strategic
intelligence picture and therefore
must be considered as part of an overall integrated intelligence effort. All
tactical commanders and staff officers
employ intelligence in planning and
maintaining the security of commands.
(2) Technical intelligence is defined as
intelligence concerning foreign technological developments, performance
and operational capabilities of foreign
materiel, which now or may eventually
have a practical application for military purposes. It is the end product
resulting from the processing and collation of technical information. However, the scope of technical intelligence
is broad; and it includes all technical
aspects of foreign equipment, supplies, installations, facilities, communications, captured and abandoned
items, conventional or special, which
now have or may have a practical application in furthering military operations. The scope also includes,
particularly during internal defense
3

operations, captured friendly and allied equipment and materiel which
may have been used against US forces.
Technical intelligence contributes primarily to the extension of the combat
intelligence effort.

c. Other terms used in this manual are(1)

Scientific and technical intelligenceincludes that foreign intelligence rehlting to basic and applied research in
natural and applied sciences and engineering; scientific and technical char.
acteristics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign weapons, weapon

systems, and other materiel; production methods employed in their manufacture, and related technology pertaining to materiel supply. operation,
and maintenance.
(2) Factory marking-the numbers, letters, symbols placed on manufactured
products (or in accompanying documents) during manufacture or inspection for purposes of identification and
,control.
(3) Significant equipment-captured enemy equipment likely to produce more
technical inteUigence of value than
others.

Section II. MISSIONS AND OBJECTIVES
3. General
The United States must maintain a supel'ior
position to all enemies and potential enemies in
any given area of technology and be alert to the
current and future technological developments
of all nations. The contributions of U.S. science
and technology have already provided a technological superiority and an extensive research
and development effort has been created in
order to maintain this superiority in the future.

4. General Mission of TechnicallnteUigence
Units
a. The mission of Army technical intelligence
units is to provide assistance to tactical commanders in the selective examination, evaluation, and classification of technical information derived from technical examination of
foreign equipment and materiel.
b. Technical intelligence units/personnel at
all levels perform a twofold function(1) They assist the tactical commander
and staff in meeting tactical planning
needs in technical areas.
(2) They assist the strategic scientific/
technical intelligence effort by supporting theater, DA and DOD agencies
in the overall integrated technical intelligence collection and analysis effort.

5. Maior Obiedives
The major objectives of technical intelligence
are to-4

a.. Determine enemy technical materiel
threats as they affect strategic and tactical
planners and commanders.
b. Determine foreign technological capabilities and limitations.

c. Provide information from which military
countermeasures are developed.
d. Permit use of foreign materiel and facilities by US forees.

e. Exploit new developments for US military
needs.

f. Fulfill national and/or military technical
"items-wanted list."
g. Provide input Gna continuous basis to the

overall national integrated technical and scientific intelligence program in consonance with
theater policies.
k. Provide tactical and strategic studies on
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of
foreign facilities, equipment, installations, materiel, and resources.

6. General Concepts
a. In order to fulfill the above missions, U.S.
Army technical intelligence units are provided
primarily to support the field army commander's
tactical technical intelligence requirements.
b. In fulfilling the above missions, military
technical intelligence units provide on-the-spot
field analysis, detailed analysis, and limited
AGO UllOA

operational data from field testing. De~iled
analysis and evaluation is performed by the
technical intelligence company of the field army
and/or higher echelons. Final and detailed
technical analysis beyond field army and/or
theater resources is performed in the appropriate CONUS-producing unit.

c. Technical intelligence requires prompt exploitation at the tactical echelon to be of maximum benefit to tactical commanders. Therefore,
technical intelligence elements at all echelons
operate as functionally integrated teams to insure maximum coordination, collation, and exploitation of foreign arms, equipment, and materiel.
d. Prompt exploitation provides usable tactical intelligence, assists in the production of
strategic technical intelligence, facilitates military training, and assists the overall national
research and development effort.

7. Expanded Mission
a. At times, the U.S. Army technical intelligence effort supports related scientific and technieal intelligence production of the Army Ma-

AGO I5seOA

teriel Command (AMC) and joint/national
intelligence requirements of Department of Defense research agencies in consonance with
theater approved technical intelligence programs.
b. In unified or specified commands, the factors of distance and processing time from the
zone of interior may make it desirable for the
commander's intelligence organizations to perform certain functions normally associated with
CONUS units. In such cases the unified or specified commander advises the higher echelon
concerned of the functions being performed.
He also insures that his action does not interrupt the flow of information to the higher echelon. Included among these functions may be(1) Publication of technical intelligence
bulletins.
(2) Publication of intelligence of a general
orientation nature.
(3) Preparation and dissemination of
other intelligence studies and documents which would lose utility if delayed by preparation in the zone of
interior.

s

CHAPTER 2
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY
Section I. MISSION AND CAPABILITIES
8. General
The technical intelligence company provides
for the selective examination, evaluation, and
classification of technical information and the
dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom,
through the technical examination of enemy
materiel.

9. Mission
a. The technical intelligence company is organized under TOE 30-34 (fig. 1) and provides
for the functionaIized execution of the technical
intelligence within the field army. This grouping, in one company, of various technical skills
provides a capability for a coordinated technical intelligence effort; provides an interchange
of skills, knowledge and experience, and a consolidation of specialized technical skills necessary to provide a widely varied functional technical intelligence support to the field army.
Normally, the unit is located in the Field Army
Support Command (F ASCOM) area and operates under the direct control of the Military
Intelligence Battalion TOE 30-25 (fig 2). This
unit is completely airtransportable; however,
it is only fifty percent ground mobile.
b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, (ACofS,
G2) Field Army. is responsible for the direction
and staff supervision of the entire technical
intelligence effort for the field army commander.
Therefore, close coordination and liaison with
the technical intelligence company and the G2
staff (e.g., Order of Battle and Strategic Intelligence) through the military intelligence battalion are necessary to insure smooth integration
of the overall technical intelligence effort.

c. The technical intelligence company is
capable of providing necessary technical intelli6

gence support to corps and divisions assigned
to the field army. In addition, it is a flexible
organization readily adaptable to the integration of technical intelligence activities of other
services and can be integrated into a joint or
unified command intelligence effort in all types
of warfare.
d. The technical intelligence company is organic to the military intelligence battalion, field
army. Cellular functional technical intelligence
teams from TOE 30-600 can provide augmentation to the unit as required. Aso, the unit is
compatible with the support systems employed
within a theater of operations and the commodity-oriented CONUS base.

10. Capabilities
a. At full strength, the technical intelligence
company has the capabilities to(l) Examine, evaluate, and classify captured enemy materiel.
(2) Prepare and disseminate technical intelligence reports, summaries, and
analyses.
(3) Prepare and maintain technical intelligence files and records.
(4) Prepare and assist in the preparation
of captured enemy materiel for evacuation to CONUS bases as required.
(5) Participate in the interrogation of
prisoners of war and to process the information derived therefrom.
(6) Operate as a control center for a coordinated technical intelligence program within the field army.
b. The unit is dependent upon theater resources for chemical and medical laboratory
support.
AGO 6590A
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c. At reduced strength, the unit is adaptable
to lesser capabilities during prolonged combat
periods for a limited period of time. In add i-

tion, the unit is capable of supporting an independent corps for a limited period of time.

Section II. FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION
11. Functions
This company performs all technical intelligence functions utilizing combat service support personnel operating as functional elements. For example, the company-

a. Assists in the technical intelligence planning being conducted concurrently by the military intelligence battalion headquarters and the
field army G2 staff.
b. Coordinates directives for the collection of
technical intelligence source materiel. This materiel normally will be evacuated through the
tactical unit support channels to the technical
intelligence company, field army.

c. Provides centralized control of all technical intelligence activities in the field army
area. (Engineer topographic, terrain intelligence, and signal communications intelligence
are not included within the scope of technical
intelligence. )
d. Is organized to function as the command
and control center for the receipt, evaluation,
reporting, and shipment of all technical intelligence materiel received in the field army.

12. Unit Operations

a. Company Headquarters. Personnel and
equipment are provided in the company headquarters for the supervision, coordination, and
control of the activities of organic platoons.
Also, unit supply, mess, maintenance, communication, and general administration are
provided.
b. Support Platoon. This platoon provides
technical support to the evaluation and analysis
sections of the company such as drafting;
illustrating; packing, crating, and shipping material; translating; and photographic services.
This allows full utilization of critical skills
within the various sections and improves support to all elements of the program. The funcAGO 5590A

tions of elements of the support platoon are as
follows:
(1) Platoon headq'LLarters. The headquarters is responsible for supervising and
directing the activities of the platoon
and providing drafting and illustrating support to the unit.
(2) Photography section. This section
provides both still and motion picture
photographic services for the company. Developing, printing, enlarging,
and other processing support is required from the Army Signal Battalion (TOE 11-95), although frequently the military intelligence
battalion can directly provide limited
support.
(3) Receiving and shipping section. This
section receives and unpacks equipment and materiel. It also packs and
crates small items of materiel for
evacuation as required. The section
has within it the necessary expertise
in the handling of explosive, chemical,
biological, and radiological materiel.
(4) Translating section.
This section
translates foreign language documents
concerning foreign technical intelligence materiel into English or other
languages as required. It also translates identification plates, nomenclature markings, and instructions accompanying foreign materiel.

c. Evaluation and Analysis Platoon.
(1) This platoon performs the detailed
analysis of documents and materiel
for information pertinent to technical
intelligence. It evaluates this information in conjunction with reports and
information from other intelligence
sources, and prepares reports for distribution as prescribed.
(2) Each of the sections in this platoon
has certain common functions and
9

responsibilities. In the production of
technical intelligence, each section,
under the supervision of the platoon
leader(a) Assists in planning the collection
effort.
(b) Provides guidance to the corps collection teams in the collection of
technical information and materiel.
(c) Evaluates and processes the collected materiel for technical intelligence information.
(d) Disseminates the resulting technical
intelligence.
(e) Assists in interrogation of prisoners
of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and escapees for
information of interest to technical
intelligence.
(3) The functions of elements of the evalnation and analysis platoon are as
follows:
(a) Platoon headquarters. This headquarters is responsible for initial
analysis of materiel, coordination of
evaluation between the various sections of the platoon, and participation in the preparation, development, and dissemination of reports
through prescribed command and
intelligence channels. The platoon
headquarters provides the control,
assignment for evaluation, and recording of disposition of technical
intelligence items. When an item of
materiel is received, the platoon
headquarters assigns the item to the
section which has primary interest,
and informs other sections having
secondary interest.
(b) Communications-electronics section.
This section performs technical
evaluation and analysis of fixed
plant communications, signal equipment, and signal information. It
supervises storage, issue, and processing of collected foreign communications materiel. It analyzes electronic warfare, automatic data
processing, combat surveillance,
10

radar, radiac, and meteorological
materiel.

(c) Weapons and munitions section.
This section performs the technical
intelligence evaluation and analysis
of free rockets, guided missiles, and
associated equipment including internal guidance and launching
equipment; weapons and combat
vehicles to include tanks, towed and
self-propelled guns, howitzers and
armored personnel carriers; nuclear
and nonnuclear ammunition; rocket
and missile warhead sections (nuclear and nonnuclear) ; chemical, biological, and radiological weapons,
munitions and ammunitions, and
propellants; explosives and pyrotechnics; meteorological and propellant-activated devices; and mines.
(d) General supply and equipment section. This section performs technical
intelligence analysis and evaluation
of general supplies; petroleum;
clothing and textiles; subsistence;
chemical, biological, and radiological equipment; and photographic
equipment.
(e) Mobility section. This section performs technical intelligence analysis and evaluation of aeronautical,
aerial delivery, surface transportation (marine and land), power
generation, construction, barrier,
and bridging equipment; general
purpose vehicles such as amphibian
vehicles to include cargo and utility
vehicles and self-propelled, tracked,
and bridging vehicles; and general
support equipment and supplies.
(I) Medical section.

This section analyzes and evaluates foreign health
problems and the organization,
training, techniques, facilities, and
materiel used by foreign medical services. In conj unction with
chemical personnel in the weapons
and munitions section and the miscellaneous supply and equipment
section, it assists in evaluating CBR
AGO 5590A

weapons effects information and advises on how they may affect operations. It also arranges for evacuation of captured foreign medical
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materiel for further analysis or exploitation. (See paragraphs 24-27
for the scope of medical technical
intelligence. )
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CHAPTER 3
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION

Section I. GENERAL
13. Overall Concept

u. The technical intelligence company contains quarter~aster, signal, transportation,
chemical, medical, engineer, and ordnance combat service support personnel. These specialists
provide the overall technical intelligence analysis and evaluation capabilities of the unit
through their extensive training, background,
and experience. When employed as functional
teams, technical analysis and evaluation is accomplished more effectively. This chapter discusses the functionalization concept as it applies to technical intelligence, covers the scope
of the broad areas of technical intelligence, and
discusses additional capabilities.
b. The proper organization and employment
of the combat service support specialists is
critical to mission accomplishment. The company must operate within clearly defined objectives, goals, and priorities prescribed by the
field army commander. Personnel must not be
given analysis tasks which can be more efficiently performed by other field army or theater
assets.

c. Each functionally organized technical intelligence team must be tailored to perform its
required mission. Teams must be flexible in
their operations since personnel of the unit will
be required to perform extensive coordination
and liaison internally for mission success.
Teams should be "tailored" to perform a specific technical intelligence function with consideration given to the training and capabilities
of the combat service support specialists. Sections must assist other sections in keeping
abreast of trends and developments which have
an impact on mutually related areas of interest.
d. The functionalized areas of interest of
technical specialists will frequently overlap.
For example, transportation, engineer, communication-electronics, and ordnance specialists
may need to work together when a new tank is
being analyzed. Also, medical and chemical specialists may overlap in CBR analysis missions.
When possible, functional teams should be composed of personnel having related functional
qualifications. They can be "tailored" to form
a working team in order to perform a specific
technical examination and/or analysis mission.

Section II. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE
14. Scope

u. The scope and/or primary objectives of
communication-electronics equipment are to-(1) Provide communication-electronics

equipment intelligence concerning the
capabilities and limitations of foreign
communication systems, both civilian
and military.
(2) Provide the field army with intelli12

gence on captured communications
equipment and systems.
(3) Provide data for possible application
in developing new US electronic equipment and devices.
(4) Provide communications-electronic
equipment intelligence for strategic
and tactical planning.
(5) Assist in providing tactical and strategic estimates on enemy communication capabilities.
AGO
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b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a
continuous need to examine, analyze, and test
communications-electronic equipment and devices and to analyze enemy communication
diagrams and schematics. Recent communication trends and developments necessitate that
the scope of communications-electronic equipment intelligence be broadened to include wire,
radio, television, satellites, telemetering devices,
electronic instruments, photography, computers, radar, facsimile, crypto, and laser communication equipment or devices.

c. Communications-electronics specialists
must maintain extensive liaison with other intelligence elements to include the U.S. Army Security Agency. They evaluate and interpret information concerning enemy electronic-communications research and must keep abreast of
civilian and industrial communication developments. In addition, they must exploit any technical data derived from other intelligence activities such as the U.S. Army Security Agency.
Therefore, the technical library must have communications and electronics information concerning details and performance data on a wide
variety of items.
b. Specifically, communications-electronics
specialists can perform the following:

(1) Exploit intelligence from captured
communication materiel.
(2) Assist in the exploitation of foreign
scientific communications-electronics
information.
(3) Prepare enemy communications-electronics intelligence studies.
(4) Evaluate enemy communications-electronics equipment information as received on a day-to-day basis.
(5) Supervise the collection and evacuation of enemy communications-electronics equipment.
( 6) Provide limited assistance as may be
required to other intelligence activities
such as U.S. Army Security Agency
and strategic intelligence elements.
(7) Maintain, evaluate, and interpret information concerning military and
civilian research and development.
(8) Assist in the exploitation of foreign
AGO 6590A

communication complexes and facilities by United States forces.

e. Communications-electronics personnel
may need to accompany combat elements whose
missions include the capture of special communication bases or targets for prompt analysis and exploitation. They assist in photographing significant items of captured materiel; however, the section is dependent on signal units
for photographic processing support.

f. Other general areas of interest to comm unica tions-electronics equipment intelligence
are(1) Acoustic equipment.
(2) Missile guidance devices.
(3) Power equipment.
(4) Meteorological equipment.
(5) Electronic countermeasures equipment.
(6) Guided missile control systems.
g. Data in the following areas are of primary
interest to communications-electronics equipment intelligence production:
(1) Output power.
(2) Frequency range.
(3) Bandwidth.
(4) Modes of operation.
( 5) Circuitry design.
(6) Antenna design.
(7) Anti-jamming features.
(8) Tube structure.
(9) Transistors.
(10) Equipment ruggedness.
(11) Maj or modifications.

15. Additional Capabilities
Signal personnel, in addition to their normal
technical intelligence functions cana. Provide recommendations on the disposition of fixed and special communication installations and/or equipment.
b. Provide limited analyses concerning radiac
equipment and meters as well as electronic,
chemical and/or biological warning devices, and
instruments.
13

Section III. WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS INTELLIGENCE

16. Scope
a. Ballistics deals with the motion of projectiles and the forces governing that motion. In
practice, this subject is of interest to the weapons and munitions analyst in analysis of smallarms ammunitions, artillery shells, bombs, missiles, and projectiles. Of particular importance
to the tactical commander are their penetrating
and fragmentation effects. The following items
of inte1ligen~e interest can be analyzed by the
weapons/munitions analysts:
(1) Type of driving/rotating band (type
of metal encircling projectile at the
base).
(2) Direction of weapon rifling.
(3) Combustion rate of the powder or repeUant.
(4) Chemical composition of powder.
(5) Layering structure of grains in
charge.
(6) Grain perforation.
(7) Size and shape of projectile.
(8) Firing tables (if present).
(9) Missiles.
(10) The use made of substitute materials.
b. The weapons and munitions technical analysts contribute to the knowledge of interior
and exterior ballistics through their use of continually revised }landbooks, their knowledge of
equations and formulas, energy motion and
burning rules, and firing tables. The integration of this data establishes the relations between powder pressure, projectile travel, and
velocity. All of these factors can contribute to
meeting the overall needs of the tactical commander; namely, analysis of enemy technical
capabilities and how the tactical commander
can best counter the enemy threat.

c. Trajectories can be computed from a particular muzzle velocity, angle of departure, and
ballistic coefficient using standard temperature,
density. and no wind. Any variations from
these conditions would be nonstandard. In
ground fire, one of the most important elements
is the determination of variations in range and
displacement of the point of fall from all possible causes. Changes in muzzle velocity, angle
of departure, and powder granules will cause
14

such variations. Firing tables can assist in producing a wide variety of technical intelligence.
Such tables are valuable since they include
range elevations or tables for a particular gun,
Also, they provide a series of tables of differential effects each of which gives the effect on
range of some particular departure from
standard conditions. Therefore, firing tables,
when available, should always accompaI~y the
weapon to which applicable and be handled in
accordance with normal technical intelligence
evacuation procedures.

17. Functions
Weapons and munitions specialists contribute
to the following:
a. Locating, identifying, examining, and submitting reports on tactical capabilities of foreign materiel and equipment.
b. Providing technical guidance to corps
technical collection teams.

c. Evaluating technical information that
flows in from the corps collection teams.
d. Assisting in the breakdown and assembly
of equipment.

e. Assisting in testing of vehicles, equipment,
and accessories.

f. Inspecting vehicles to determine major
modifications and changes.
g. Assisting in analysis of parts, assemblies,
engines, power trains, and chassis for collation,
updating, or incorporation of data for technical
intelligence manuals or handbooks.

h. Performing analysis on missiles and associated equipment.

i. Assisting in the production of technical intelligence from factory markings.

18. Additional Capabilities
The weapons and munitions section includes
chemical equipment analyst for the identification and evaluation of flamethrowers, smoke
generators, and other chemical weapons and
munitions.
AGO 6690A

Section IV. GENERAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE
19. Scope

a. Supply and equipment technical intelligence personnel playa primary role in supply
and maintenance technical intelligence and contribute to the tactical mission through analysis
and evaluation of enemy supplies and/or resources. Specific areas of interest are subsistence, individual equipment, clothing, general
supplies, petroleum, maintenance, and such
services such as graves registration, laundry,
and bath.
b. In the preparation of a technical intelligence analysis of enemy combat service support, supply and equipment technical specialists
must take into account enemy economic factors
(e.g., food, agriculture, and industrial production), the enemy labor force, and enemy technological capabilities. In this regard, close coordination with strategic intelligence elements
at field army level is imperative.

c. Exploitation of enemy materiel begins as
soon as its existence is discovered in order to
determine the immediate tactical usefulness and
significance of the materiel. Exploitation of
materiel in the field is performed to the extent
that field conditions and facilities permit.
Exploitation in the field does not replace the
need for exploitation in CONUS. Materiel that
cannot be used or exploited in the field or theater of operations must be evacuated to the
United States for complete detailed analysis
and exploitation.
20. Functions

a. An increase, decrease, or other change in
the enemy's supplies gives an indication of
change in enemy combat service support capabilities. The examination of captured items
must, of necessity, involve a continuous study
of the items themselves in conjunction with the
applied sciences which made the development
of these items possible. All analyses need to be
evaluated in terms of the social and cultural
environment of the enemy.
b. In assembling supply and equipment intelligence information, supply and maintenance
specialists analyze and evaluate foreign activities to include the following:
AGO 6690A

(1) Determining the design, performance,
source and methods of manufacture,
and methods of storing items.
(2) Examining supply and maintenance
organizations, installations, and storage depots.
(3) Determining characteristics, limitations, vulnerabilities, and military
potential of military and civilian
facilities.
(4) Processing and abstracting information from foreign commodities and
equipment acquired in a field army
area of responsibility.
( 5) Preparing technical intelligence reports and studies concerning such
items as petroleum, food, clothing, and
equipment.
(6) Assisting in the training of field army
personnel in supply and equipment intelligence.
(7) Producing and mai~taining information and intelligence concerning foreign materiel and commodities.
(8) Assisting in the analyses of enemy
storage, packing, and preparation of
food and equipment.
21. Additional Capabilities
a. In conj unction with other technical intelligence specialists, supply and equipment specialists provide a capability to the field army for
supervising battlefield collection of a wide variety of items. For example, through the use of
mobile laboratories available at theater level.
the analysis, evaluation, and identification of
captured foreign petroleum products and facilities for U.S. tactical uses are facilitated.
b. Other areas of technical intelligence to
which supply and maintenance specialists can
contribute through analysis are(1) Troop subsistence supplies.
(2) Commodity items.
(3) Food spoilage and contamination.
(4) Packaging and marking.
(5) Acquisition of data concerning draft
animals and protective clothing.
15

c. Supply and maintenance technical intelligence personnel can perform the following for
order of battle intelligence:
(1) Identifications based upon enemy uni-

forms, insignia, and decorations.
(2) Maintain supply and equipment intelligence files as they pertain to logistics.

d. The section also includes highly trained
chemical personnel for the operation of the
CBR agent sampling and analyzing kit. The
operation of this kit is under the supervision of
a chemical officer who is an organic chemist.
Chemical personnel assigned to the general
supply and equipment section evaluate chemical
defense equipment, including individual and
collective protection equipment, and decontamination equipment and supplies.

Section V. MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE

22. Scope

23. Functions

a. The scope of mobility intelligence is comprehensive. It covers most aspects of engineer
and transportation activity at all echelons of
the enemy's military organization. Engineer
and transportation support is of a greater
variety today and has become increasingly more
important in all types of military operations.
Also, there has been an increasing use of all
types of engineer and transportation equipment
by supply and transport agencies of all armies.

a. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to
limited analyses and evaluation of technical
intelligence concerning the following:
(1) Foreign engineer equipment to include
its capabilities.
(2) Enemy construction operations, techniques, and resources.
(3) Lines of communication (roads,
bridges, waterways, etc.).
(4) Public utilities.
(5) Materiel quality and shortages.
(6) Enemy depots, dumps, and supply
points.
(7) Defenses and fortifications.
(8) Town plan analysis and urban area
studies.
(9) Water-crossing equipment and techniques.
(10) Maintenance of a bibliography of
foreign military and civilian engineer
specialists and engineer order of
battle.
(11) Airborne drop zones.
(12) Underground facilities and tunnels.

b. The mobility technical intelligence specialists will usually be involved in both strategic
and tactical technical intelligence. The field
army technical intelligence company will have
to meet the needs of the theater and lower
levels. Frequently, the same items of mobility
intelligence may be needed by numerous levels
within the field army and the theater. For
example, the condition and capacity of highway
and railroad facilities in a contiguous geographical area may influence the decision to launch a
certain military operation. Therefore, mobility
intelligence will play an important part in the
overall strategic and tactical planning for field
army and theater forces.
C'. Mobility specialists can contribute to CBR
intelligence in a variety of ways. Because of
their training, the engineers can assist in studies to evaluate the destructive effects of nuclear
weapons on the terrain, aboveground and
underground structures, installations, equipment, and stored supplies. Mobility specialists
contribute intelligence repori.q and studies on
such items as soils, structures, facilities, and
man-made objects such &q roads, railroads,
bridges, airfields, ports, utilities, urban areas,
and military installations.

16

7>. Transportation mobility specialists in the
mobility section can contribute primarily to the
production of mobility intelligence concerning
all foreign air, land, and water transportation
systems of immediate or potential military importance. This intelligence concerns characteristics, conditions, development, organization,
materiel, operation, maintenance, construction,
performance, capabilities, and limiting factors
of enemy and/or selected foreign transportation systems and facilities (e.g., highways, railways, waterways, ports, harbors, industrial,
and scientific installations and transportation
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supplies). Mobility intelligence is necessary for
contingency planning and emergency operations. Therefore, transportation specialists
will need to produce intelligence on adj acent
friendly countries for use by technical and
strategic planners and combat service support
elements. Frequently, the United States may
use another nation's transportation system.

c. Mobility specialists can contribute to the
following:
(1) Integration and coordination of the
transportation collection effort.
(2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing,
and dissemination of transportation
information and data.
(3) Assistance in the preparation of
transportation estimates.
Section VI.

MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE

24. Scope of Medical Intelligence

a. Medical intelligence is a functional entity
and should not be fragmented. Medical technical intelligence is not primarily materiel oriented. Examination, evaluation, and classification of medical materiel are only segments of
the total medical technical intelligence effort.
If possible, medical intelligence must retain
integrity so that the end product will include
all available information affecting the health
and welfare of men and animals in actual or
possible areas of military operation which is
immediately or potentially significant. Such
information is vital in both strategic and tactical planning and may influence military operations.
b. The field army surgeon can assist in
providing requirements for medical information/intelligence to the command G2. The intelligence produced should be coordinated and
evaluated by the field army surgeon and staff
prior to dissemination.

c. The theater command can provide valuable
assistance and guidance to the field army medical technical intelligence effort. The theater
surgeon can coordinate the employment of medical units in support of medical intelligence
activities and arrange for support of field army
medical intelligence activities by theater level
AGO 5590A

(4) Assistance in the interrogation of
civilian and military personnel having
transportation intelligence information.
(5) Assistance in strategic transportation
planning.
(6) Evaluation of new transportation
modes, systems, and related equipment.
(7) Assistance in determining an estimate
of enemy capabilities to transport
missiles and nuclear weapons.
(8) Evaluation of economic and technical
aspects of foreign transportation systems.
(9) Compilation of data on enemy and/or
foreign transportation modes, systems, facilities, and equipment.

units as appropriate. The theater surgeon and
staff can assist the field army G2 in determining potential tactical and strategic applications
of fully evaluated medical intelligence produced
by field army technical intelligence elements.

25. Medical Intelligence Functions
The following specific technical intelligence
functions are performed by medical specialists:

a. Collect, examine, classify, and evaluate
raw information concerning non-US health
problems, training, and materiel used by foreign medical services.
b. Provide medical intelligence information
to the field army surgeon through G2 for professional evaluation prior to dissemination.

c. Assist in the interrogation of prisoners of
war, refugees, deflectors, and escapees to obtain
medical information.
d. Assist in the investigation of medical aspects of incidents involving diseases or enemy
CBR operations.

e. Accomplish initial examination and evacuation of captured foreign medical materiel to
include escort of live cultures to CONUS.

f. Assist in the compilation of environmental
data pertinent to health aspects of military
operations.
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g. Provide technical staff advice on medical
intelligence to include the scope of medical
subjects to be incorporated into medical unit
training programs.

f. Civil affairs public health teams who obtain information on the public health services
and facilities in an area of operation.

h. Provide limited analysis on drugs, serums,
and antibiotics.

27. Additional Capabilities

26. Sources
The principal sources of medical information
of potential intelligence value include-

a. Direct observation of patients and medical
service operations, both military and civilian.
b. Discussions with personnel involved directly or indirectly with medical service operations (enemy, allied, or civilian).

c. Study of military and civilian reports and
publications of a medical or technical nature.
d. Prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and friendly escapees.

e. Examination of enemy medical materiel,
facilities, and personnel prQtective devices.

In addition to their normal technical responsibilities, medical technical intelligence personnel can perform the following:

a. Assist in the identification of CBR agents.
b. Assist in the evaluation of CBR weapons.

c. Provide information and data on medical
aspects of enemy combat operations.
d. Assist as required in the preparation of
medical studies and reports of tactical significance.

e. Collect data regarding enemy military and
civilian medical facilities.

f. Provide advice on communicable diseases.
g. Provide limited analysis of drugs and
serums.

Section VII. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR)
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
28. Scope

For purposes of this manual, chemical,
biological, and radiological (CBR) technical intelligence includes the following tasks and
functions:

a. The collection, examination, evaluation,
identification, and dissemination of information
on equipment, materiel, and documents pertaining to chemical, biological, and radiological
operations under conditions of nuclear or nonnuclear warfare.
b. The collection of samples of chemical,
biological, and radiological agents employed
against friendly forces; the identification of
chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples
to a supporting- general chemical laboratory for
analysis; the transmittal of biological samples
to a supporting medical laboratory for analysis;
and the collection and forwarding of radiological samples to a supporting general chemical
laboratory for determination of radio isotopic
composition.
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c. The determination and dissemination of
information pertaining to enemy techniques
and procedures of decontamination; individual
and collective protection; CBR agent detection
and identification procedures, fallout predictions and procedures for CBR attack warning;
radiological monitoring and survey operations;
impregnation and reimpregnation of clothing;
field laboratory services; and assistance in determination of enemy organization and operational effectiveness in chemical, biological, and
radiological operations under conditions of
nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.
d. The collection and dissemination of information about foreign chemical and biological
production and storage installations, facilities,
capabilities, and stockpiles.

e. Assistance, within the technical intelligence company capabilities, in developing field
countermeasures against chemical, biological,
and radiological operations under conditions of
nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. The use of
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chemical and biological munitions introduces
new factors into technical intelligence operations. In this area, the most critical function
of the technical analyst lies in determining the
effectiveness of such munitions, technical characteristics, detection, unique modifications, and
the need to develop rapidly effective countermeasures. Close coordination with the theater
general chemical laboratory, with army medical
service laboratories, and with staff chemical
officers is essential because of the constantly
developing and changing state of the art.

29. Nature of Chemical, Biological, and
Radiological Technical Intelligence

a. Chemical, biological, and radiological technical intelligence is an integral part of the total
military intelligence effort and is essential to
military operations. The possibility or probability of use by the enemy of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, the enemy level
of training, the effectiveness of enemy offensive
and defensive equipment, the potential for waging CBR operations, and the capability to
defend against these weapons are important
considerations at every level of military planning. The impact that employment of CBR
operations will have on friendly forces makes
timely technical intelligence information essential. The initiation of CBR operations can
change the entire course of a war. The CBR
technical intelligence organizational requirements generally fall into two functional categories(1) An organization for the collection
effort.
(2) An organization for the evaluation

and analysis effort.
b. The collecting of CBR technical intelligence is, for the most part, dependent on the
effectiveness of the overall intelligence collection plan using all available sources of information. On-the-spot preliminary evaluation and
dissemination of significant information may
be done in connection with the collection effort
when the situation warrants, but final detailed
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analysis will not always be accomplished by
technical intelligence collecting personnel. Prior
to use of CBR weapons, enemy capabilities to
employ these weapons must be considered as
well as the magnitude and location of the probable employment and the enemy capability to
defend against surprise employment of these
weapons by friendly forces. Once these weapons have been employed, priority in the collection effort shifts to identification of agents employed; tactics, techniques, and procedures
used; information on new weapons and agents;
size and location of stockpiles; and targets for
engagement.

30. Functions
Chemical personnel in technical intelligence
units assist field army commanders in the following areas:

a. Examining captured CBR materiel.
b. Examining, evaluating, and identifying,
when possible, equipment related to CBR operations.
c. Assisting personnel, as may be required, in
the identification of biological agents.
d. Providing technical assistance to army
and corps staff on CBR matters.

e. Maintaining liaison with chemical mobile
laboratory teams.

f. Preparing intelligence reports and estimates.
g. Assisting, as required, in the location and
evaluation of CBR targets.

31. Additional Capabilities
Chemical personnel have the following additional capabilities:
a. Assisting in laboratory analysis of POL
products and, in conjunction with medical
laboratory personnel, determining the effects
of chemical and biological agents on POL products.
b. Collecting CBR samples following enemy
attack for analysis and delivery to supporting
laboratories for identification.
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CHAPTER 4
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND COLLECTION

Section I. PLANNING
32. General
a. Effective technical intelligence production
requires broad planning in a variety of technical areas. Extensive planning outside the technical intelligence company will frequently be
required to fulfill all production responsibilities
especially in some highly technical areas such as
electronics, missiles, and sensors (app II).
b. A continuous requirement exists for detailed technical intelligence planning in preparing estimates of enemy tactical capabilities
that have been or will be fielded in the near
future.

33. Command Responsibilities

a. The collection and production of technical
information are a function of command. The
complex nature and importance of technical
intelligence requires that a commander use all
the means available to insure its success. Tactical commanders and units are the key to successful execution of technical intelligence plans.
Prior technical planning is required for combat
missions; otherwise the technical intelligence
production cycle may be disrupted.
b. Intelligence staffs at all echelons are responsible for detailed planning concerning the
exploitation of captured enemy equipment, materiel, installations, facilities, and commodity
items within their area of responsibility. They
must insure that(1) Members of the command are properly
trained in the recognition, proper
handling, and reporting of captured
enemy equipment, materiel, and documents.
(2) New or unusual equipment/materiel
or equipment modifications remain in
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place, if possible, for exploitation by
appropriate intelligence personnel.
(3) Proper safeguards are provided for
captured equipment/materiel to prevent looting or retention as souvenir
items.
(4) Appropriate reports on captured
enemy equipment and materiel are
furnished to higher headquarters.
(5) Technical intelligence collection personnel supervise and direct the evacuation of captured or abandoned enemy
materiel
from
collection
points
throughout the field army area.

34. Operational Planning
The technical intelligence company is responsible for internal planning as it affects
analysis, evaluation, integration, and production of technical intelligence necessary to
satisfy overall field army needs.

35. Additional Planning Factors
a. It is imperative that technical intelligence
management, planning, and production be
standardized to minimize duplication of effort
and dissipation of resources. For example, report standardization facilitates planning, production, assignment of responsibility for specific items, collation of resources, programing,
meeting time schedules, and dissemination of
the end product.
b. Effective technical intelligence planning
is characterized by the following (app III) :
(1) Mission analysis.
(2) Requirements and priorities are balanced with collection and production
capabilities.
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(3) Proper intelligence collection agencies
are assigned.
( 4) Proper functional teams are formed
for maximum equipment and materiel
exploita tion.
(5) Vital support areas are considered,
such as equipment tags, evacuation
procedures, and establishment of specific collection points for foreign
materiel.

c. Planning consideration must continually
be given to the quality of technical intelligence

production, its responsiveness to needs, and
costs of the overall production effort. Technical
intelligence is a time-consuming process which
requires imagination and insight into its operation.
36. Requests for Technical Intelligence

a. Requests for tactical technical intelligence
are submitted through intelligence channels

and must be as specific as possible for planning
purposes. Further, requests based on previous
technical and/or combat intelligence reports
should fully identify such reports. Requests
must be carefully screened to prevent overstatement of requirements.
b. Requests for technical intelligence should
follow theater policies and include, as a minimum, the following:

(1) Requesting organization.
(2) Specific requirement.
(3) Scope of requirement.
(4) Reason for requirement.
(5) Pertinent data of assistance to technical intelligence personnel.
(6) Date desired.
(7) References (if applicable).

Section II. COLLECTION
37. General

a. In the direction of the overall intelligence
collection effort, the technical intelligence company and corps field collection teams must continually coordinate their collection efforts with
unit intelligence personnel at the small unit
level through periodic visits, dissemination of
guidance, and emphasis on the importance and
timeliness of technical intelligence and captured equipment from all possible sources. Most
materiel, equipment, and documents captured
will be collected by frontline tactical units.
Other items of equipment and materiel may be
captured in raids, found abandoned in overrun
areas, seized, requisitioned, purchased, or confiscated by civil affairs units. Only through a
continual indoctrination effort at all echelons
can maximum effectiveness of the technical
collection effort be achieved.
b. There are many information collection
and production elements that are capable of
providing support to technical intelligence units
in the discharge of their responsibilities. Some
sources of assistance are(1) Order of battle.
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(2)
(3)
( 4)
(5)
(6)

Strategic intelligence.
Special operations.
Counterintelligence.
G2 air.
Interrogation of prisoners of war.
(7) Long range patrols.
(8) Civil affairs units and teams.
38. The Collection Effort

a. The overall intelligence collection plan or
schedule will select those intelligence collection
assets which can best fulfill the collection needs
of the technical intelligence company for the
production of technical intelligence, (e.g., long
range patrols and corps technical intelligence
collection teams). The technical intelligence
unit should make frequent recommendations
for inclusion in the overall intelligence collection plan to insure that its specific equipment
and materiel needs, including technical documents, manuals, and photographs, are met.
Critical components of bulky equipment and
materiel must be completely identified to aid
the collector in his collection efforts. In addition, when component elements of a piece of
equipment are required, identification must be
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complete and specific to preclude collection of
a complete item when only a portion is required.
Also, provisions must be made to insure collection of items of opportunity.
b. Frequently, many priority collection requirements will revolve around the ItemsWanted List (IWL). This is an alphabetical
listing containing information, artist sketches,
and/ or photographs of equipment and materiel
which are required by higher echelons and
agencies for intelligence purposes, testing,
evaluation, planning, or study. The equipment
contained in the listing must be evacuated immediately. Technical intelligence collection personnel at corps must be frequently briefed on
this list, 2nd tactical units must receive instructions on what to do should the items be
acquired.

c. Technical intelligence collection requires a
system of priorities since some types of information and/or equipment will always be more
critical than others. The intelligence staff must

use a collection schedule with established priorities prepared as far in advance as possible. If
it is known, for example, that transportation
equipment studies will be prepared each year,
technical equipment and materiel needed for
this requirement must be incorporated on a continuous basis into the overall collection plan.
Collection requirements for technical informationwill need to be programed in advance by
the technical intelligence unit to insure inclusion of its own requirements as well as those
of other headquarters.
d. The theater prepares technical intelligence
directives and levies collection tasks, usually in
accordance with DOD requirements, on appropriate technical intelligence and/or intelligence
units to meet specific needs. The field army G2
staff element f1.pecifically controls technical intelligence by collating collection requirements
with those tasks which have aready been developed or which are in the process of being
developed.

Section III. COLLECTION AGENCIES AND LIAISON
39. Agencies

A technical intelligence collection agency
refers to a person, unit, organization, or instrumentality which collects or acquires technical
data. This varies from routine troop collection
to collection by research, observation, analysis
and evaluation, or interrogation. Some intelligence collection agencies that contribute to the
overall technical intelligence program are combat troops, military intelligence battalion collection elements, corps technical intelligence collection teams, and civil affairs units. Also,
psychological operations units and special
forces operational detachments can contribute
to the collection as long as they are not detracted from their primary missions.
a. Combat Troops. Troops in combat are
usually the first to encounter enemy materiel or
new or modified foreign materiel, sometimes
with documents intact. The intelligence officer
at each appropriate level must insure that captured equipment and/or documents are recovered for technical intelligence exploitation.
It is imperative that vital technical intelligence
materiel and equipment and new discoveries be
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exempt from destruction. Every effort must be
made to insure that enemy equipment, materiel,
documents, and logistical complexes are
promptly safeguarded and reported to an element of the technical intelligence company so
that the maximum technical information can
be obtained. These principles must be thoroughly considered and implemented in all operational plans and briefings at each level of command. They should be emphasized in unit training programs.
b. Intelligence Persornnel. Personnel of intelligence sections and field army intelligence
units will come in contact with numerous technical documents, data, information dealing with
foreign materiel, and military and civilian personnel who are excellent sources of technical information. Therefore, frequent coordination
and liaison between the technical intelligence
company personnel and intelligence elements
at all echelons is mandatory.
c. Corps Technical Intelligence Collection
Teams. These teams are trained to collect and
search for tactical information on foreign materiel, facilities, methods, techniques, and techAGO 5590A

nical activities. These units work with various
corps elements and contact front-line tactical
elements for collection of materiel. The teams
are organic to the corps and assist primarily in
carrying out the technical intelligence collection
responsibility.
d. Civil Affairs Units. The civil affairs organization consists of staffs, units, and functional teams. Civil affairs units provide command support or area support to tactical or
administrative units and are designed to support civil affairs operations at specific echelons
of command or level of government. The size
and capabilities of civil affairs units and cellular functional teams may vary; ho\vever, the
personnel assigned to them are trained specialists who are technically qualified to provide assistance in various specialized functional areas
which are considered to be in the normal range
of technical intelligence units. These areas
include-

(1) Food and agriculture.
(2) Public communications.
(3) Public health.

(4) Public transportation.
(5) Civilian supply.
(6) Public works and utilities.
(6) Commerce and industry.

e. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Units.
These units perform psychological operations
functions in support of theater and field army,
corps, and division. Personnel of PSYOP units
possess and can lend assistance in special skills~
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technical knowledge, and the use of such items
as radio, loudspeaker, and printing equipment.
40. Collection Liaison

Frequent coordination and liaison are required between the technical intelligence company and field army intelligence elements at
all subordinate tactical echelons. Army intelligence units can provide many items of captured
enemy materiel. Frequent visits must be programed by technical intelligence elements to
key tactical units with actual or potential access to enemy or foreign materiel. In addition,
liaison is required among key combat, combat
support, and combat service support elements.
Effective liaison aids in insuring that the following are accomplished for the collection effort:

a. Enemy equipment is promptly secured,
safeguarded and evacuated.
b. Locally procured indigenous items are
quickly identified together with their sources.

c. Coordination with allied collection agencies achieves maximum value and enemy equipment obtained by allied intelligence counterparts reaches US technical intelligence channels.
d. Technical intelligence personnel are kept
current on technical trends and developments.

e. Intelligence collection plans are fulfilled
and kept current.

f. Combat and combat support units are
thoroughly indoctrinated on their technical intelligence roles.
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CHAPTER 5
CAPTURED MATERIEL EVACUATION

Section I. GENERAL
41. Concept

a. Captured materiel with explanatory technical documents is one of the most important
sources of technical intelligence. Combined
with technical interrogation reports and other
intelligence data, this source can lead to valuable combat intelligence on enemy capabilities
limitations, and probable courses of action:
Every effort must be made to insure that captured materiel and documents of intelligence
value are immediately placed into technical intelligence channels for prompt exploitation.
b. Exploitation of captured materiel takes
place both in the theater of operations and in
the CONUS base. Final, complete, and detailed
analysis is performed in CONUS. Captured
materiel of technical intelligence interest can
be exploited at predesignated collection points
at division, corps, field army, and/or theater.
Technical intelligence collection teams can be
sent forward to echelons below division collec-

tion points to examine materiel when needed.
If necessary, captured materiel can be evacuated directly from the division collection point
to the technical intelligence company at field
army for exploitation. Collection points at
theater army support command (TASCOM)
can be utilized to augment those resources
located in the field army service support area.
All items for CONUS exploitation are forwarded to the Foreign Technical Intelligence
Officer (FTIO), Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland (para 95b).
42. Report Credibility

All technical reports produced by the technical intelligence company should bear the following statement on the cover to give official
credence to the report:
This is a United States Army Technical Intelligence Report. The data contained herein
was derived through limited testing, analysis,
and examination utilizing U.S. Army Laboratory and test facilities.

Section II. RECOVERY PROCEDURES
43. Collecting Points

Maintenance collecting points are designated
facilities to which captured or abandoned foreign materiel is evacuated for temporary storage and proper disposition in accordance with
technical intelligence requirements. Collecting
points operate, where needed, throughout the
theater of operations. In the field army area,
one or more collecting points can be provided
for each corps area and for the field army
service area. In the division areas, maintenance
collecting points are operated by the division
maintenance battalion. Evacuation flow through
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collecting points is as shown in figure 3. The
unit specifically designed to operate collecting
points in the field army service area is the
collection and classification company (TOE 29139) assigned to the army support brigade.
Collecting points operate for the classification,
segregation, disassembly, and disposition of
serviceable and unserviceable foreign materiel
in accordance with guidance and instructions
provided by the field army commander.
44. Equipment Recovery Guidelines

Responsibilities for recovery and evacuation
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of foreign materiel at various levels are similar
to those for U.S. materiel. The discovery of
items of foreign materiel, however, will be reported by the capturing unit through intelligence channels. Items for which there are no
disposition instructions should not be evacuated until coordinated with technical intelligence elements. The capturing unit must submit a preliminary technical report to the intelligence officer of its higher headquarters.
(See annex B of app IV.) The capturing unit
may be directed to evacuate the item to the
collection and classification company or guard
it and leave it in place for on-the-spot preliminary screening by technical intelligence personnel. When materiel does not have to remain in
place for intelligence evaluation and the discovering unit is incapable of evacuating it, the
unit may request evacuation assistance directly
from the command responsible for direct support maintenance. Evacuation may be direct
from a maintenance collecting point to the technical intelligence company at field army in accordance with the following guidelines:

a. Foreign materiel may be of value for technical intelligence purposes, or it may be utilized
by friendly forces. Foreign materiel should be
cleared from the battlefield or destroyed to prevent recapture or reclamation by the enemy or
by guerrilla forces.
Section III.

c. Items of foreign materiel being evacuated
directly to the field army support area are
reported through higher headquarters to the
technical intelligence company and held until
disposition instructions are provided or responsibility is assumed by another activity such as
the technical intelligence company.
d. Items which are of no use either for technical intelligence or for equipping friendly
forces are demilitarized and disposed of as
directed by higher headquarters.

e. General support maintenance units of the
field army support command direct support
units in recovery and evacuation operations by
providing backup recovery and evacuation support. Such support is limited and is of an
emergency nature. Detailed information on
recovery and evacuation procedures is contained in FM 29-22.

COLLECTION TEAMS, EXAMINATION, TAGGING, AND EVACUATION

45. Functions of Corps Technical Intelligence
Collection Teams

a. The corps technical intelligence coordinator on the corps G2 staff must work closely
with the technical intelligence collection teams
that operate within the corps areas of responsibility. Close liaison will be necessary since the
corps technical intelligence coordinator must
depend upon the collection teams for preliminary examination, analyses, evaluation, and
assistance in evacuation of equipment acquired
by the corps tactical elements.
b. The primary functions of the technical intelligence collection teams are to establish
liaison and coordination with the collection and
classification companies that operate collecting
points for foreign materiel; to render support
to corps tactical field elements in collection;
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b. Technical intelligence elements of the military intelligence battalion and the intelligence
officers of all commands are interested in captured or abandoned items of foreign materiel.
Procedures must be established for the screening and evacuation of all materiel. Implementing instructions are published by subordinate
commands in the form of directives and SOP's.

perform on-the-spot technical examination;
provide technical advice and supervise the
evacuation of equipment, as required. The
teams assist in equipment identification; provide instructions and insight on the use of
enemy equipment; provide countermeasure advice; and recommend on-the-spot destruction
of captured enemy materiel, if necessary. In
addition, they assist corps subordinate unit intelligence officers in the accomplishment of
their individual technical intelligence responsibilities, and provide limited technical intelligence data through the use of technical handbooks and/or reference books. They collect,
examine, select, and expedite evacuation of foreigh equipment and materiel throughout the
corps area as directed. In addition, they are
responsible forAGO 5590A

(1) Preparing special reports on significant enemy equipment.
(2) Providing limited technical advice and
user instructions on the use of captured equipment by US forces.

c. In a fast-moving, fluid tactical situation,
it is imperative that technical intelligence collection teams located at corps come forward to
tactical units to analyze captured equipment or
materiel. This is necessary to prevent loss of
potentially vital technical intelligence. Photographs, sketches, diagrams, and general observation of equipment must be made to prevent
total loss of technical intelligence should the
equipment be recaptured or the area overrun,
or should the equipment have to be destroyed
in place to prevent recapture.
46. Examination Obiectives

a. The first objective of technical intelligence
analysis (after enemy materiel is captured) is
to obtain information of tactical value to combat forces. Information obtained includes the
following:
(1) Determination of equipment operational characteristics, performance,
capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
(2) Recognition of new significant weapons.
(3) Identification.
(4) Analysis for modifications.
(5) Countermeasures.
(6) Identifying and properly handling
radioactive materiel.
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b. Effective technical intelligence is derived
from data acquired by actual examination, field
testing (when possible), limited laboratory
analysis, and integration with other known intelligence data. Examination and analysis
should be performed using any accompanying
foreign language documents captured with the
materiel.

47. Marking and Tagging

To facilitate segregation, collection, further
detailed analysis, and shipment of materiel for
intelligence purposes, weather-resistant equipment tags produced locally within the theater
are securely attached to the item itself and to
the shipping container (figs. 4 and 5).
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(In language of area of operations)

Figure 4. Equipment marking tag.

a. Equipment tags accompany the materiel
to its final destination. Article 103, Uniform
Code of Military Justice, is printed on the
reverse side of the tag to forestall tampering
(fig. 5).
b. In addition to the establishment of proper
safeguards, all military personnel should receive training in equipment tagging responsibility in conjunction with other intelligence
training and in the consequences of failure to
27

o

ARTICLE 103, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
a. All persons subject to this code
property taken from the enemy for the
States, and shall give notice and turn
thority, without delay, all captured or
their possession, custody or control.

shall secure all public
service of the United
over to the proper auabandoned property in

b. Any person subject to this code who: 0) fails to carry
out the duties prescribed in subdivision (a) of this article;
(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of
captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or
expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another
directly or indirectly connected with him; or (3) engages in
looting or pillaging; shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.

Figure 5. Reverse side of equipment marking tag-Article 103.

execute this responsibility. Also, troops must
be indoctrinated not to deface original markings on materiel at the time of its capture.

c. Tagging, marking, crating, and preparation for shipment to CONUS is the major re28

sponsibility of the recovery and shipping section of the technical intelligence company in
accordance with field army and theater policies.
However, the section must depend upon field
army support command elements for the preparation and shipment of bulky items.
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48. Evacuation Guidance
The general plans, policies, and procedures
for evacuation of all foreign equipment and
materiel are prescribed by the joint/unified/
theater and field army headquarters. These
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general plans normally are based upon DA and
D IA policies and guidance. Each command
echelon within the field army must insure that
its plans are in accordance with field army
directives and the overall field army technical
intelligence plan.
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CHAPTER 6
PROCESSING OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Section I. PROCESSING
49. Technical Information Processing
a. At times, the wide range of technical expertise necessary for mission accomplishment
will not be found within the technical intelligence company. Normally, the broad range of
technical equipment/materiel will necessitate
the highest degree of functional coordination
within the technical intelligence company in the
utilization of varied experience, technical training, and background.
b. Processing is the first step in the intelli-

gence cycle whereby technical information becomes intelligence. The three phases of technical intelligence processing are(1) Recording.
(2) Evaluation.
(3) Interpretation.

c. In urgent situations, technical information
can be processed as received without waiting
to collect additional supporting information if
background files and an adequate data base
have been accumulated and kept current. The
intelligence produced in such a situation may be
crucial, if, for example, the intelligence derived
contains data on missiles capable of carrying
nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.
50. Recording
Recording is the first step in processing.
Technical information and data are recorded in
journals and workbooks and in intelligence files
to aid technical analyst in grouping related
items of information and to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. Recording involves reducing information and data to written or
graphic form and grouping together related
data to facilitate evaluation and interpretation.
Recording facilitates the preparation and dis30

semination of technical intelligence reports and
makes subsequent interpretation and evluation
easier. Commonly used combat intelligence aids,
such as the intelligence worksheet and intelligence journals, can be adapted for technical
intelligence needs. When the need is urgent, the
recording step can be omitted to permit more
rapid evaluation, interpretation, and immediate
dissemination to tactical units.

51. Evaluation
Evaluation determines the pertinence of information. It consists of the critical appraisal
of data for its subsequent interpretation. It includes determining the reliability of the source
and agency and the accuracy or credibility of
the information. The system applicable to
evaluation is described in FM 30-5 and has been
standardized for use by NATO Forces and
other allies.

a. Evaluation involves systematically arranging all pieces of information and comparing known data with the current state of the
art. This process must be carried on continually
at all appropriate echelons. As technical information flows to the technical intelligence company, it must be associated with all related data
including previous technical reports.
b. Evaluation requires a comprehensive technical knowledge which rarely is possessed by
one individual. Evaluation, therefore, will require close coordination witltin the technical
intelligence company.

c. Technical evaluation must take into consideration the industrial and scientific base and
capability of the enemy. Evaluation estimates
based solely on United States standards must
be avoided. Foreign equipment and materiel
AGO 6690A

may appear wholly inferior when judged by
American standards; however, when judged by
the standards of the specific army and area in
which they were developed, the items of equipment may be superior and considered to be
highly effective.
d. Evaluation ratings should be made at the
technical intelligence company. The evaluation
step of processing is never omitted.
52. Interpretation

This step is the result of critical judgment
evolving from evaluation and subsequent analysis, integration, and deduction. It is the mental
process of determining the importance of information, integration of this with other technical
data, and deduction. The analysis function is
centralized in the evaluation and analysis platoon of the technical intelligence company, since
frequent coordination within the company is
necessary to fully exploit the wide variety of
equipment and materiel. The field army G2
staff element integrates the analyzed technical
information with intelligence produced by all
other intelligence elements to arrive at an estimate of the capabilities and limitations of foreign military armed forces.

a. Analysis. Analysis requires a thorough
knowledge of enemy equipment and materiel
to include past technological trends, developments, and tactical doctrine on equipment use.
Analysis involves detailed research when the
volume of technical data increases.
b. Integration.
( 1 ) This step is lengthy and consists of
combining numerous isolated elements
of technical information with other

technical data to form a logical conclusion. More than one technical conclusion may be formulated based upon
other existing and finished intelligence. Technical intelligence conclusions are made with primary emphasis upon the tactical mission. This
phase requires good judgment, experience, a varied background knowledge,
and a knowledge of scientific methods.
When formulated, all technical hypotheses, if possible, should be tested
for validity and reliability.
(2) The technical intelligence company
must integrate the technical information provided by all intelligence collection agencies in order to construct an
objective assessment of enemy capabilities. Technical intelligence is by
nature a complex task requiring extensive coordination and collation by
highly competent specialists capable
of using their technical background,
training, and expert opinions of technical reports in relation to available
combat and strategic intelligence. Extensive integration must be performed
by the field army intelligence staff in
collating finished technical intelligence
from other military intelligence battalion elements prior to the final dissemination of technical intelligence.

c. Deduction. Deduction is the last step in
interpretation. This step consists of deriving
meaning from the hypotheses that have been
developed and tested. Deduction provides answers as to the meaning of technical intelligence and data in relation to the tactical situation and area of operation.

Section II. ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
53. Considerations

a. The producers of technical intelligence
must constantly keep in mind that actual and
potential enemy capabilities, limitations, and
probable courses of action are being developed
at the field army, theater, and national levels.
Based upon the technical intelligence produced,
new requirements for U.S. equipment are developed. Any pertinent intelligence that will
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assist in the preparation of new U.S. military
equipment and/or countermeasures must be
considered by the technical intelligence producer during the entire technical intelligence
production cycle. For this reason, technical
intelligence should be coordinated with all intelligence elements.
b. Factors which must be regularly considered by technical intelligence producers include,
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but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Effects of terrain and weather.
(2) Characteristics, performance, and
effectiveness of enemy equipment and
materiel.
(3) Countermeasures that are effective
against enemy equipment.
(4) New design features and modifications
of old and/or new equipment.
(5) Overall combat intelligence requirements.

54. Technical-Military Reference Library

a. Technical intelligence production, research, analysis, and evaluation cannot be conducted without a current data base. The need
for specific data requirements, performance
characteristics, equipment descriptions, operational limitations of materiel, and the extensive need for integration and collation of technical information covering wide areas necessitate
the provision of a technical intelligence reference library. This library will prove to be one
of the most useful working tools for the technical intelligence company. As a minimum the
technical library should include(1) Technical Bulletins.
(2) Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by
country).
(3) Catalog of Foreign Material.
(4) DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence Registers.
(5) Organizational and Logistical Data
Handbooks.
(6) Enemy tactics and operational concept studies.
(7) Technical equipment documents and
studies.
(8) Order of battle handbooks.
(9) Enemy Tables of Organization and
Equipment.
(10) Appraisals of enemy equipment.
(11) Equipment vulnerability studies.
(12) Threat studies and assessments.
b. Library technical publications not only
provide accurate and timely technical information and intelligence references, but in the
interest of field army consumers they provide
limited and selective technical intelligence support, thereby reducing the need for direct unit
support. Library technical publications must be
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oriented toward the needs of combat, combat
support, and combat service support users and
field army requirements.

55. Use of Experts and/or Organizations
a. The technical intelligence company will
sometimes require assistance from military
and/ or civilian personnel or organizations to
assist in the technical analysis of materials to
fulfill a special tactical or strategic mission.
This may occur when the expertise needed to
solve a highly technical and complex problem
is not available within the technical intelligence
company. Therefore, maintaining an up-to-date
"Technical Expert File" (of names) will prove
invaluable. When utilized, these "experts·'
should work directly with the technical intelligence company, and must possess the proper
security clearance; they should be used as consultants/ advisors for a short period of time.
The most important criterion governing the use
of these individuals is that such service should
normally be voluntary.
b. Military and/or civilian personnel whose
training could be of special interest to technical
intelligence units for analysis and production
services include(1) Ammunition maintenance technicians.
(2) Guided missile maintenance personnel.
(3) Nuclear weapons specialists.
(4) Guided missile and special weapons
personnel.
(5) Ammunition supply specialists.
(6) Data processing personnel.
(7) Electronic countermeasures personnel.
(8) Cryptographic personnel.
(9) Comm unica tion security analysts.
( 10) Optical specialists.
( 11) Explosive ordnance specialists.
(12) Petroleum product analysts.
(13) Guided missile propellant and explosive specialists.
(14) Geographers, geologists, and/or construction specialists.
(15) Photograph experts.
(16) Communication specialists.
( 17) W ea pons systems analysts.
(18) Chemists, physicists, and biologists.
( 19 ) Radar specialists.
(20) Indigenous surgeons and medical specialists.
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56. Photography

a. Photographs are a valuable source of
permanent information for technical analysis
and evaluation. Frequently, technical intelligence analysts supplement their finished reports with photographs, diagrams, and charts.
Equipment and materiel will often be captured
or confiscated by fast-moving tactical units;
photographs of this materiel can be sent to the
rear by technical intelligence collection teams
prior to the receipt of the actual equipment.
In a fast moving tactical situation, the photograph will be the only item available to the
analyst if the equipment becomes lost, damaged,
destroyed, or recaptured. For this reason, technical intelligence collection teams at corps must
be cognizant that one of their first specific acts
should be to photograph in place all items of intelligence value from as many different angles
as required.
b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated,
and compared, and must be accompanied by ap-

propriate written descriptions prior to further
detailed evaluation and dissemination. The
data available from a photograph may be highadvantageous to the analyst; however, skill and
training of the analyst are very important in
exploitation of photographs. Photographs permit a vast quantity of data base information to
be rapidly analyzed, collated, and filed. Once
photographs of equipment are taken, equipment
should be rapidly evacuated. All photographs
must contain a ruler, scale, or other measuring
comparison to assist the analyst and other users
of the information.

c. Long range patrols, special forces operational detachments, and other intelligence collection elements can provide photographs of
special items of intelligence interest when operating behind enemy lines. However, their use
must be coordinated at the appropriate echelon
and they must be thoroughly briefed on technical intelligence requirements prior to dispatch
on these missions.

Section III. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
57. Classification

Technical intelligence reports from the technical intelligence company are produced in accordance with appropriate army regulations in
the 380-series. When equipment is acquired
through a friendly foreign government, the specific security classification assigned by that
government must be adhered to and given
equivalent protection by being assigned to
Group I in accordance with AR 380-6. Otherwise, classified technical intelligence reports
will be assigned to Group 3 as stated in AR
380-6. (Paragraph 59 discusses the various
types of reports.)
58. Security Policies

a. At times, technical intelligence involves
sensitive security equipment/materiel and
therefore will require stringent security controls by the technical intelligence unit. A unit
technical intelligence SOP covering security is
mandatory in order to provide an adequate
security framework to support operational requirements. The technical intelligence SOP
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must be precise, yet flexible, and should follow
the following minimum guidelines:
(1) Requirements for sensitive technical
intelligence materiel in support of assigned missions must be carefully
planned and should be revised periodically.
(2) Information and materiel should be
disseminated on a need-to-know basis
in accordance with specific security
regulations.
(3) Care must be taken not to overclassify.
b. At times, indigenous personnel may be
required for a specific mission. Because of the
sensitive nature of many areas of technical intelligence, information should be released only
after:
(1) An explicit need-to-know has been
established.
(2) Care has been taken to furnish only
tho3e portions for which need-to-know
has definitely been established.
(3) The security requirements imposed by
security regulations have been complied with.
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(4) It has been determined that released
information is in the best interests of
the United States.

c. Special provisions must be prescribed by
technical intelligence units for handling critical
captured enemy equipment such as communication security equipment. This equipment must
be classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher and
designated "crypto," and tagged and evacuated
to the nearest U.S. Army Security Agency

(USASA) elements as soon as practicable.
Some components of intelligence interest are as
follows:
(1) Speech security devices.
(2) Teletype security devices.
(3) Data security devices.
(4) Off-line encryption devices.
( 5) Key lists.
( 6 ) Code books.
(7) Documents, manuals, circuitry diagrams, and all ancillary equipment.

Section IV. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
59. Reports (see STANAG 2084 app IV)
Six types of technical intelligence reports are
generally used in the exploitation of captured
materiel. These are-

a. Spot Report. This or written report is
prepared by the capturing units and/or intermediate command echelons to rapidly report by
electrical or other means the acquisition of captured or abandoned foreign materiel through
their next higher headquarters to the technical
intelligence company. The basic items of this
report should normally include as a minimum:
(1) Who is reporting (unit)?
(2) What is being reported?
(3) Where and when (coordinates)?
(4) How much materiel?
(5) Whom to contact.
(6) Condition of materiel.
b. Preliminary Technical Report. This report
is prepared and disseminated through intelligence channels on all captured foreign materiel. It is prepared by corps technical intelligence collection teams or the capturing unit.
The preliminary report places emphasis on
alerting other tactical units to significant new
tactical capabilities. It is prepared in the
format as shown in Annex B of STANAG 2084.
c. Complementary Technical Report. This
report is prepared by technical intelligence collection teams operating throughout a corps
area in support of corps elements. It is a limited
report for the use of the technical intelligence
company and such other intelligence elements
as the military intelligence battalion or field
army G2 staff elements. It supplements information in the PRETECHREP.
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d. Detailed Technical Report. This report is
the responsibility of the field army technical
intelligence company and is prepared by
various combat service support specialists in
a coordinated effort. No format is specified because of the wide variety of materiel usually
contained therein.
e. Technical Document Report. This report
is written on all captured enemy technical documents such as maintenance handbooks, operation manuals, drawings, and sketches.

f. Special Technical Report. Special technical
reports are prepared as required by field army
G2 staff elements and higher echelons
primarily as input to studies, plans, and contingency planning requirements. These reports
contain special information on items of significant intelligence interest. No format is prescribed for these reports, and content is governed by the nature of the technical intelligence
desired.
60. Combined Operations Reports

Appendix V outlines current N A TOstandardized nomenclature as prescribed by
STANAG 2097. When possible, all technical
intelligence report nomenclature should be
N A TO-standardized and should be in consonance with overall unified/joint/theater policies
and guidance. The reports that can be used by
technical intelligence elements in all combined
operations are:

a. Spot Report (SPOTREP).
b. Preliminary
TECHREP).

Technical

Report

(PRE-
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c. Complementary Technical Report (COMTECHREP).
d. Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP).
e. Technical Document Report (TECHDOC).
61. Using Instructions

Captured materiel which is later put into
service and used by United States or Allied

forces requires using instructions. Technical
intelligence company personnel involved in detailed analysis at F ASCOM are responsible for
preparing and distributing using instructions.
Such instructions, when· published, should
always be a part of the final detailed report
(DETECHREP) prepared by the company.
Reports should always be annotated to indicate
they are official field army technical intelligence
reports.

Section V. DISSEMINATION

(5) Special technical studies and estimates.
(6) Handbooks.
(7) Technical pamphlets.
(8) Briefings.
(9) Liaison visits.

62. General

The timely dissemination of technical intelligence reports is of maximum importance to
tactical, combat support, and combat service
support commanders. The field army intellig~nce staff uses technical intelligence reports
as a basis for estimates, recommendations, and
interpretation of information received.
63. Methods Used

a. The methods used to disseminate technical
intelligence depends upon the detail and
urgency of the intelligence and upon who the
intended users are. Primary consideration
must be given to the needs of the tactical users.
The most common means of dissemination are:
(1) Detailed technical reporfs (app IV,
STANAG 2084).
(2) Technical intelligence bulletins.
(3) Technical reviews and summaries.
(4) Special technical reports.
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b. Before technical intelligence is transmitted
to intelligence staffs for the normal processing
and conversion into intelligence, the data must

be(1) Screened for elimination of nonessential information.
(2) Translated into a nontechnical language to permit general understanding.
(3) Interpreted, analyzed, and coordinated
among all other combat service support specialists serving on functional
technical intelligence teams.
(4) Collated with other related intelligence and data as appropriate.
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CHAPTER 7
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Sedion I. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) SUPPORT
64. General

a. Combat service support for technical intelligence encompasses EOD, military police, and
civil affairs support.
b. Experience shows that about five to ten
percent of ammunition employed will fail to
function as originally intended. Compounding
this problem are the use of missiles and
delayed-action and influence-type fuzes on
many types of ammunition and the introduction of "home made" explosive devices. The
term "explosive ordnance" includes conventional ammunition as well as chemical, biological and nuclear ammunition.

c. Recovery and evacuation operations are
often complicated by the presence of ammunition items in or on equipment. In addition, the
possibility that abandoned items have been
boobytrapped must always be considered. It is
necessary, therefore, that personnel engaged in
recovery and evacuation operations be constantly on the alert for such items. Extreme
care must be taken to prevent explosions, fires,
radiation burns, and accidental functioning.
Accordingly, assistance of explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) personnel should be requested
to provide explosive disposal support. The
potential represented by modern chemical, biological, and nuclear ammunition has placed
increased emphasis upon this requirement.

items of foreign ammunition or the modification of old.
b. Information on foreign ammunition assists in determining order of battle intelligence; evaluating probable enemy courses of
action, capabilities, and vulnerabilities; and developing countermeasures. The markings on a
bomb, missile, or shell; the materials used or
substituted; or the mere fact that the item
exists may be of great strategic value. Identification of the filler may establish requirements
for special protective or retaliatory measures
against conventional, nuclear, chemical, or biological attack.

c. Knowledge of employment, effectiveness,
and possible countermeasures are of immediate
concern tactically. The type and caliber of
enemy supporting weapons can be determined
from captured enemy ammunition, duds, components, and fragments. Sabotage devices being
introduced by clandestine means can provide
valuable indi~ators of probable enemy courses
of action.
d. Manufacturing methods and details of design may be of value to research and development agencies of the Army. The development of
effective EOD render-safe procedures and tools
for first-seen enemy ammunition is of particular importance to the safety of EOD personnel and to the accomplishment of their mission.

65. Technical Intelligence Value

66. Information Desired

a. Foreign ammunition encountered in the
field may be of considerable intelligence value.
There are many intelligence, research, and development agencies in the Army and in other
departments of the government that may benefit from prompt information concerning new

Technical intelligence information desired on
ammunition includes:
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a. New items of enemy ammunition, together
with complete technical data on construction,
markings, and functioning.
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b. Design or change in design of known
ammunition.

c'. Changes in manufacturing techniques.
d. Quality and type of material and/or explosive content.

e. Packing, storing, and maintenance techniques.
/. Data concerning place and date of manufacture.
g. Documents pertaining to the above, including sources of information.

67. EOD Team Operations
The EOD unit commander is solely responsible for determining the proper procedure to
use in accomplishing the disposal operation for
each project assigned to his team. Technical
intelligence specialists provide technical advice
to the team as required. Selection of the best
method of disposal depends on a number of
factors including the location, amount, and nature of the explosive involved, proximity to
structures and facilities; accessibility; condition; and personnel safety. Tasks to be performed include-

a. Identification. All ammunition is first
identified to determine the disposal procedure
to be used. First-encountered foreign ammunition and markings must be photographed for
technical intelligence and EOD purposes. Special procedures required by technical intelligence for photographing various types of markings are followed by EOD personnel. A written
memorandum is prepared on the spot to include
a concise description of the item, sketches, and
details of location.
b. Destruction in Place. Nondestructive
render-safe procedures should be used on firstseen foreign ordnance. If it cannot be rendered
safe or removed, the item should be destroyed
in place in such a manner as to minimize damage. Samples of chemical or biological agent
fillers are extracted from chemical or biological
ammunition and preserved for laboratory analysis by technical intelligence personnel.

c. Recovery. Unrecognized items and those
for which search has been directed by higher
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authority should be recovered whenever possible, even at the expense of considerable risk.
Recovery of components and fragments of such
items may be equally important. Such recovery
is of value to technical intelligence and CONUSbased DA research elements in the development
of disposal methods and tools. The following
minimum guidelines apply:
(1) New or unknown types of foreign ammunition recovered by EOD personnel must be turned over to technical
intelligence units for disposition. Security classification of the items and
their components will not be lower
than SECRET.
(2) Foreign nuclear weapons or components, to include sabotage devices,
are evacuated through technical intelligence channels. Security classification of such items will not be lower
than SECRET RESTRICTED DATA.
(3) In addition to security escorts, technical escorts are required to provide
safety control for shipments of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other
hazardous items of ammunition. Within the field army, technical intelligence personnel will coordinate with
appropriate staff officers to determine
the need and arrange for technical
escorts. For shipment of such ammunition to CONUS, the theater intelligence officer determines the need and
arranges for technical escorts.
(4) Collection of technical intelligence
data will, in many instances, entail
dismantling the ammunition and stripping fuzes and other dangerous components for analysis and evaluation.
These operations should be conducted
only by experienced EOD personnel.
In many cases, complete dismantling
and stripping may be beyond the capability of small units in the field. Unless
the urgency requires the acceptance of
a high degree of risk, the item is evacuated. Dismantling and stripping is
conducted only in response to a valid
requirement placed through technical
intelligence or EOD staffs.
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(5) Captured mines and boobytraps
should be analyzed and/or tested only
by trained weapons/munitions specialists who are thoroughly familiar
with their construction, techniques,
and use. Extreme caution must be
exercised when such things as taut
wires and pull releases are encountered, since any explosive item can
be used as a boobytrap. Unusual
mechanisms used as boobytraps
should be immediately reported to
the technical intelligence company
through use of the spot report. Any
countermeasures must be coordinated
with explosive ordnance demolition
personnel. Final disposal of explosive
components or hazardous materials
associated with such devices and with
recovered ammunition is the responsibility of EOD personnel.
68. Reports

All information gathered by EOD personnel
on first-seen foreign ammunition must be reported immediately through EOD control centers to EOD staff officers. At staff level, such
reports will be placed in intelligence channels in
accordance with intelligence regulations. Two
types of EOD reports are required in the field:
preliminary technical reports and complementary technical reports.

a. Preliminary Technical Repo'rts (PRETECHREP). These reports are prepared by
EOD personnel upon recognition of the ammunition as an item of technical intelligence value.

The reports are used to alert technical intelligence teams so that they may be dispatched
to the site. In addition to the information prescribed in Annex B, STANAG 2084, a recommended tentative render-safe procedure should
be indicated by the EOD unit commander.

b. Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP). These reports are prepared by
technical intelligence teams as prescribed in
Annex D, STANAG No. 2084. In the absence
of technical intelligence personnel, the report
will be prepared by the EOD unit. This report
contains complete and detailed information not
found in the PRETECHREP. It will be submitted by the fa*st available means to the
technical intelligence company.
69. Dissemination

Technical intelligence on ammunition and
missile warheads may be disseminated from
any level. Information in reports being transmitted to higher echelons, or received from
other sources, which may be of value to disposal personnel of a lower command should be
extracted and published at once. The Foreign
Science and Technology Center, U. S. Army
Materiel Command, makes available foreign
ammunition items, reports, and evaluations required for study and use in the development
of EOD tools and render-safe procedures. The
need for the strictest secrecy in explosive ordnance render-safe procedures is extremely important in order that the enemy does not learn
when effective measures for disarming his
ammunition have been developed.

Section II. MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT
70. General

Military police can often contribute significantly to the command's technical intelligence
effort. Military police characteristically perform duties on an area-wide basis; they are
trained observers; and their close association
with numerous law enforcement and other civilian agencies during the course of normal duties
can be effectively utilized in certain aspects
of the development of technical intelligence.
This effort should not, however, be exploited
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to the detriment of their primary duties of providing police or investigative services to the
command.
71. Collection

As collection agencies, military police units
and personnel, particularly criminal investigators, are well suited to assist in such functions
as:

a. Collecting and reporting items of foreign
material on the "Items Wanted List."
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b. Locating specific technical items of equipment.

c. Locating personalities and activities within a specialized technical field.
d. Reporting items of potential technical intelligence value determined from prisoner of
war (PW) and civilian internee sources.

e. Reporting items of potential value confiscated or captured in raids.

(7) Boobytraps.
b. The senior military police representative
at each command closely coordinates with the
technical intelligence staff officers of the appropriate headquarters to insure that items in the
above-listed categories are included on the
"Items Wanted List" and that potentially usable technical information is mutually exchanged.

74. Materiel Obtained by Military Police
72. Security and Escort
Items of materiel captured or received by
U. S. military forces and determined to be
of technical intelligence value will often require
safeguarding not only during storage but also
during evacuation. Military police normally
provide physical security at storage depots and
during movement to the rear when the materiel
is determined to be "sensitive." Military police
escorts are provided for safeguarding classified
information.
73. Using Agency

a. Military police have a continuing interest
in technological changes and developments of
foreign nations in the following general categories for possible adaptations to U. S. military
police use:
(1) Physical security devices, including
protective alarms and all types of intrusion-detection devices.
(2) Traffic control devices, including electronic speed and surveillance devices.
(3) Police and investigative equipment,
such as identification systems and
photography.
(4) Automation of police records on offenders, criminal.;:;, and prisoners; and on
traffic, and law enforcement files and
systems.
(5) Riot control munitions, devices, and
techniques.
(6) Industrial defense equipment and
techniques.

The different items of foreign materiel subject to confiscation from prisoners of war include arms; ammunition; military equipment
(except mess equipment, metal helmets, and
protective masks); military documents, such
as military codes and ciphers; pictures and
maps or sketches of military installations or
implements of war; and signal devices. All
other property taken from prisoners is grouped
in the category of retained or impounded property and must be accounted for or Ultimately
returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces
assume custody.
75. Marking of PW Materiel
a. Procedures for marking foreign materiel
of potential technical intelligence value that is
taken from PW should include means of positively identifying the materiel with the PW.
This is necessary because prisoners and materiel will often by evacuated through separate
channels, and accurate identification of the PW
will facilitate future location. This would also
facilitate the identification of certain property
which must eventually be returned to the PW
by regulations. (STANAG 2084, app IV.)
b. Capturing troops are authorized to obtain
nothing more than the name, rank, and service
number of the prisoner. Military police detachments assigned to the lowest level of command
should, therefore, provide as much as possible
for a positive means of identification such as
a photograph or fingerprints of the PW to be
affixed to the materiel tag.

Section III. CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT
76. General
The nature of civil affairs operations reAGO 5590A

quires its personnel to develop and maintain
close relationship with the civilian population.
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As previously stated, this puts civil affairs personnel in a favorable position to collect intelligence information as well as to obtain foreign
materiel! equipment and technical information
which may be of significant value to the technical intelligence effort of the command.

77. Collection Potential
Civil affairs personnel, in the conduct of their
day-to-day operations, may encounter persons
with potentially valuable technical knowledge,
materiel/ equipment, and technical documents.
These persons may be sources of technical
intelligence and may include(1..
Civilian technicians among refugees,
evacuees, and displaced persons.

b. Military personnel with technical backgrounds impersonating civilians.

c. Civilian technicians and scientists associated with the hostile government or forces.
d. Governmental technical_ documents, specialized libraries, and archives.

e. Industrial and scientific records.

f. Technical blueprints, plans, manuals, or
other information pertaining to technical intelligence in the mobility, communications-electronics, weapons and munitions, chemical, and
medical fields.
78. Procurement and Identification
a. Direct support to technical intelligence
units may be provided by civil affairs units in

40

the possible procurement of technical materiel!
equipment, identification of technical personnel, and recruitment or hiring of civilian technicians or scientists.
b. Aside from the normal procurement of
civilian real property, civil affairs personnel
may procure(1) Civilian equipment such as recording
devices, radios, weapons, or other
items which may be found as personal
possessions.
(2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other
medical supplies.
(3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction
equipment, and materials.
(4) Fuels, lubricants, greases, and propellants.

c. Through contacts with civil organizations,
leaders, political enemies of the hostile regime,
and various other segments of the population,
civil affairs personnel can provide valuable assistance in the identification of individuals having technical knowledge such as(1) Civilian technicians-engineers, architects, chemists, and physicists.
(2) Professional personnel-doctors, surgeons, dentists, nurses, lawyers, and
university professors.
(3) Skilled craftsmen/laborers-mechanics, gunsmiths, electricians, draftsmen, and allied personnel engaged in
the production of weapons, vehicles,
missiles, tracked vehicles, aircraft,
and other equipment.
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CHAPTER 8
INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS
Section I. GENERAL
79. Characteristics
a. Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and
priorities in internal defense development assistance operations will differ from those in
limited and general conflict. While some procedures may vary, the principles of technical
intelligence remain unchanged. However, additional considerations will be necessary in
applying these principles. Military units, for
example, may be dispersed for independent!
decentralized operations. Movement of technical intelligence personnel must be by the fastest
means available. Likewise, evacuation of enemy
equipment and materiel must be performed by
the most secure means available, usually by air,
to prevent recapture or loss. The technical
sophistication of the insurgent's equipment and
materiel normally is not as extensive as that of
a conventional enemy. Enemy materiel consists priniarily of small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars obtained from friendly,
neutral, and hostile nations. Such equipment is
often augmented by primitive but nevertheless
effective weapons such as crossbows, mantraps, sharpened stakes, and the like.
b. Technical intelligence specialists must be

thoroughly familiar with the characteristics,
capabilities, and performance of the small
arms and weapons from a variety of friendly
and non-friendly nations. The insurgent usually has a limited capability to perform modifications to weapons and materiel. If these modifications are not carefully analyzed and evaluated, their significance and the conclusions
drawn can be misleading. Often, technical
intelligence derived during internal defense
operations has serious national and political
consequences; it must therefore be accurate.
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c. Arms caches and weapons-smuggling are
frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms
caches can be of major significance politically
and tactically. Arms caches and logistical stores
should be carefully analyzed and evaluated for
technical intelligence usually in a combined
effort with the host country. The discovery of
arms caches, when carefully exploited by functionally integrated technical teams, can lead to
valuable intelligence about the overall insurgent tactical situation. Normally, all captured
equipment and materiel becomes the property
of the host country, and for this reason combined operations, liaison, and coordination are
important to insure full exploitation. The disposition of foreign materiel may be governed
by status of forces or other agreements, thus
complicating the collection and analysis problems. Close coordination by technical intelligence personnel with tactical units, civil affairs
units, and all U.S. government departments
and agencies engaged in collection is important.
Combined (U.S.-Host Country) technical intelligence operations are a particularly effective means of improving collection capability
by using the language and area knowledge of
native military personnel.
d. The scope of insurgent warfare can encompass the elite and professionally trained
military forces as well as local guerrillas or
part-time fighters and noncombatants. However, substantial differences exist in armament,
organization, training, equipment, and overall
effectiveness. Technical intelligence collectors
and analysts must be cognizant of these differences in all analyses. Familiarity will insurgent tactics, doctrine, and organization will
greatly enhance the technical analysis and
evaluation capabilities of the technical intelligence unit.
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80. Cold War Operations
a. In cold war operations, prior to initial
deployment of combat forces, the early detection and identification of equipment and materiel used by hostile forces assume paramount
importance. The establishment of identities
of outside logistical sources of supply is imperative and assists in the determination of diplomatic action, overall strategy, force structure,

and military equipment which should be deployed for successful mission accomplishment.
b. Should Military Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, or Military Missions be
present in a foreign country experiencing insurgency, their capabilities and background
information data can be used to supplement the
initial technical intelligence data base in order
to begin technical intelligence collection and
analysis.

Section II. RESPONSIBILITIES
81. Technical Intelligence Emphasis

During internal defense operations, technical
intelligence personnel perform normal duties as
described for conventional operations; however,
particular emphasis must be placed on the
following:

a. Training host country combat personnel,
as necessary, in technical intelligence collection
and evacuation procedures.
b. Coordinating technical intelligence matters with other services having a technical intelligence interest and with the host country.

c. Assisting in the organization and development of a host country technical intelligence
capability if required.
d. Performing more on-the-spot technical intelligence analysis and evaluation of enemy
equipment and materiel.
e. Providing technical advice and assistance
to host country military technical intelligence
personnel as required.

f. Assisting in adapting ideas and techniques
of insurgents for use by US forces as feasible.
82. Role of the Unit Intelligence Advisor
a. The intelligence advisor plays a basic role
in technical intelligence collection by coordinating host country requests for technical intelligence support, providing technical intelligence

advice, and informing US intelligence staffs
when significant discoveries of insurgent equipment, materiel, or arms caches are acquired.
Technical intelligence collection/analyst personnel must keep the unit intelligence advisor
informed of important guerrilla weaponry developments in addition to helping him maintain
a technical intelligence "Item-Wanted List."
b. Since the unit intelligence advisor is responsible for advising and training host country forces in all aspects of intelligence, to include technical intelligence, a mutual flow of
technical information between the advisor and
advisee is mandatory. Mutually defined goals
and objectives between an advisor and advisee
are essential.

83. Combat Service Support Role
If an insurgency progresses into a war of
movement, technical intelligence becomes important to the success of combat intelligence.
Combat service support staffs expand their
participation in the technical intelligence production effort through advice at all command
echelons. All technical intelligence must be
processed through intelligence G2/S2 staff elements; however, close coordination with technical service staffs during the interpretation and
evaluation phase is mandatory. The establishment of a combined US and host country technical intelligence center may become advisable.

Section III. PROCEDURES
84. Analysis
a. Technical intelligence collection and analysis becomes more complicated in internal de-
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fense operations since the combined political or
military objective often is more than merely
seizing and holding terrain. Information of the
AGO 5590A

technical characteristics of insurgent weapons
must be continuously updated and expanded as
the weapons appear. Otherwise, the tactics
and efforts needed to isolate the insurgent cannot be adequately determined. When a blockade
is used to stop the flow of arms and ammunition
to the insurgent, technical intelligence analysts
must be particularly thorough in collection,
analysis, and evaluation. For example, supply
shortages and small changes in the chemical
composition of propellants and demolitions or
shortages might be indicators of the potential
effectiveness of a blockade.
b. It is imperative for political/military purposes that technical intelligence personnel keep
abreast of outside military assistance furnished
such as modern anti-aircraft missiles, guns,
propellants, and petroleum products. For example, analysis of new missile propellants can
give vital indications of enemy tactical capabilities.
85. Investigative Data

a. The technical intelligence collection teams
have a responsibility to conduct weapon and
ammunition cache investigations and make reports thereon. Thousands of caches, depots,
salvage points, and small factories may be discovered over a period of time and need to be
fully exploited. Most of the weapons and ammunition will be a mixture of those from other
nations to include our own. Statistical data
must be maintained on weapons, ammunition,
and supplies that have been captured by our
forces. Technical intelligence plays an important role in the maintenance of such data and
in determining its overall significance.
b. The discovery of arms caches may occur
frequently and may completely tie up technical
intelligence specialists. At times, on-the-spot
analyses may have to be performed by functional teams. One of the most important problems facing technical intelligence specialists
will be the planning for exploitation of these
arms caches. Priorities must be established
with primary consideration given to tactical
needs. The entire analysis effort can be materially assisted by proper troop orientation in
all aspects of technical intelligence, close coordination with major tactical headquarters,
and placement of proper emphasis on the
"Items-Wanted List."
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c. Technical characteristics of a newly encountered enemy weapon or item of equipment,
in addition to providing valuable combat intelligence, can, when scientifically analyzed, be used
in strategic intelligence and as an aid in determining enemy technical, industrial, and manufacturing capabilities. In addition, it is possible
by analysis of the marking of cartridge cases
to determine the plant and country where the
cartridge was manufactured.
d. In th~ event of capture of a large number
of like items of equipment or materiel, the technical intelligence collection teams must examine
the materiel and obtain all available information relative to lot numbers, date of manufacture, and factory markings that may assist in
providing information on the item. A sufficient
number of items must be transmitted through
technical intelligence channels to properly
evaluate the item. The remaining items are
then processed through normal evacuation and/
or salvage supply channels for use as needed by
friendly forces.

e. Information on the use of "primitive
weapons" such as poisonous spikes, crossbows,
and deadfalls must be widely disseminated together with appropriate instructions on
countermeasures.

f. The technical intelligence personnel of the
field collection teams coordinate operations with
explosive ordnance disposal teams if dud rounds
of any type are suspected.
86. Logistical System
Although the logistical system of the insurgent may be rudimentary and primitive, the
technical intelligence analysts may be required
to deal with a variety of commodity items for
intelligence purposes (e.g., ealt rations, agricultural products, primitive drugs, and serums).
The capability of the insurgent's logistical system to support sustained military operations
may well be determined through technical analysis of commodity items.
87. Combined Operations
a. A major problem of technical intelligence
is the acquisition of the necessary language
skills and experiences to perform technical
analysis and evaluation of technical equipment
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in a foreign country. Therefore, combined
operations with the host country forces are
usually imperative. Host country military personnel who possess some limited technical training are utilized to assist in analyses. Close
supervision is necessary. With additional training, such personnel can assist in overcoming
language and operational problems. Also, civil
affairs units, if available, may assist in the
acquisition of necessary linguistic personnel.
b. Indigenous technical intelligence person-

nel who are thoroughly familiar with the culture and environment of the insurgent are an
asset to the analysis, evaluation, and collation
of certain types of technical data and information. For example, the living habits of guerrillas living in underground tunnels can be useful in evaluating and updating important
technical data. Classrooms, billets, hospitals,
and stored materiel may be indicators which
lead to valuable intelligence.

88. Search and Destroy Operation
a. An important characteristic of internal
defense operations is the extensive use of
"search and destroy" tactical operations which
do not emphasize holding terrain. In addition
to the potential loss of valuable intelligence,
these operations present a formidable problem
for the technical intelligence collection teams
and analysts. Technical intelligence collection
teams coordinating with tactical units must
emphasize that such operations should attempt
to avoid the destruction of potentially valuable
technical equipment/materiel and facilities.
Therefore, technical intelligence personnel must
brief tactical elements on current "ItemsWanted Lists" and other items of significant
intelligence interest. In this manner, sound decisions can be made by tactical commanders
and staff officers in avoiding the destruction of
potentially valuable intelligence. Proper planning, implementation, and dissemination of the
operations order can minimize the loss of potential intelligence.
b. Tunnels and excavations are frequently
used by the insurgent in order to provide protection to personnel and supplies. When these
are discovered, they must be destroyed. However, tunnels and excavations may contain a
44

wide variety of potential intelligence information that should be collected prior to their
destruction. Time permitting, the following
checklist should be used by tactical units in
submitting information reports on the destruction of all such facilities(1) Location (coordinates).
(2) Evaluation of construction.
(3) Specialized underground areas (classroom, training).
(4) Installation of internal communication facilities.
(a) Internal to internal.
( b) Internal to external.
(c) Use of special antennas.
(5) Power available.
(6) Alternate/emergency power system.
(7) Storage facilities (effect of weather
on).
(8) Assessment of construction of internal operational facilities (shops,
tool-making, repairs).
(9) General assessment of health facilities.
(a) Waste disposal.
(b) Water facilities.
(c) Contamination.
(d) Care of sick and wounded.
( e) Assessment medical standards.
(10) Assessment of training facilities (if
applicable) .
(11) Measures
taken
against severe
weather.
(12) Assessment of political propaganda
indoctrination
(documents, newsposters, magazines, printing presses).
(13) Evaluation of use of environmental
resources.
(14) Evaluation of local/commercial resources (lumber, cotton).
(15) Special items of interest.
(16) Recreation facilities.
(17) Assessment of defensive areas.
(18) Internal security or warning devices.
(19) Assessment of intelligence or intelligence related activities.
(20) New field expedients (of major and
constant interest).

89. Boobytraps and Mines
a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are used
widely by the insurgent. Frequently mines,
booby traps, and emplaced munitions are used
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for harassment of military operations; therefore, it is imperative that technical intelligence
specialists keep abreast of these munition developments. The employment of explosive ordnance materiel must be analyzed on a continual
basis. For example, duds can easily be modified
and used as booby traps.
b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in
coordination with EOD personnel, can provide
the following principal information when such
weapons and tactics are used.
(1) Fragmentation radii.
(2) Modifications made to boobytraps and
mines.
(3) Construction of locally manufactured
mines.
(4) Principal fuzing systems (pressure,
pull, chemical).
(5) Types of explosives (bomb, grenade,
artillery, mortar).
(6) Fuze ingredients and structures.
(7) Modifications to mortar and artillery
fuzes.
(8) The use of "commercial devices" or
materiel.
(9) Foreign manufactured items used III
mines and booby traps.
(10) Use of triggering devices (battery or
blasting machines).
(11) Use of chemical devices.
(12) Use of large bombs.

c. Dissemination of technical intelligence
concerning booby traps and mines should be
made together with countermeasure training
data.
90. Civilian Technicians
During internal defense operations, it is possible that civilians having technical knowledge
will come under civil affairs control upon liberation of an area from insurgent control.
Their evacuation for interrogation purposes
may not be desirable because of the attitude
of the civil population at the time. However,
the civil population will in all probability be
screened by U.S. or host country civil affairs
units or police elements. When civilians having
technical skills are identified and they can contribute potential technical intelligence information, they should be referred to technical intelligence elements.
AGO 5590A

91. Propaganda Equipment

a. Psychological operations are widely used
in an insurgency and in a limited and general
war environment. The discovery of insurgent
propaganda equipment requires analysis by a
functional team consisting of supply, chemical,
and equipment personnel to analyze the printing presses, chemicals, inks, and paper being
used. Such analysis is necessary to assess
guerrilla methods and determine sources of
supply. Communications-electronics specialists
can assist psychological operations personnel in
the analysis of loudspeakers and radio broadcasting equipment.
b. The technical intelligence aspects of operable foreign radio and television stations and
printing facilities are important in furthering
the field army psychological operations capability. Such installations and facilities should
be turned over to civil affairs and psychological
operations units for maximum exploitation.

c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities
can be used to further enhance the overall technical intelligence effort. Specific items of equipment desired can be advertised, offering a
monetary reward to potential defectees. However, such a program must be strictly controlled
and be approved at the highest echelon.

92. Long Range Patrols

a. The long range patrol (LRP) company
has a limited capability to acquire and exfiltrate
small portable items of enemy equipment or
materiel, and can be used under exceptional circumstances. However, it must be emphasized
that such missions should not interfere with
primary patrol missions. The requirements for
the long range patrol requires coordination and
approval at higher headquarters.
b. The long range patrol (LRP) companies
of the corps or their equivalent command structure will have an extensive need for technical
intelligence. Frequently, special technical reports and data will have to be furnished for
special missions. The nature of LRP mission
may necessitate observation, identification, and
reporting of enemy equipment and materiel
over periods of 3 to 5 days. Such special missions require the most current technical infor45

mation and data. Prior to dispatch of the LRP
on certain special missions, technical intelligence personnel may be requested to provide a
general technical briefing on equipment and

46

materiel to the patrol to contribute to mission
success by accurately identifying enemy equipment and materiel which may be observed or
used by the enemy to detect such patrols.
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CHAPTER 9
THE STRATEGIC EFFORT

93. General

a. The overall military technical intelligence
effort plays a vital role in the U.S. strategic/
national, scientific, and technical intelligence
effort. Equi!)ment, materie1, data, and information are provided on a continual basis to the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which acts
as the central military technical intelligence
coordinating office, and eventually to CONUSproducing units where long-range technical!
scientific intelligence and equipment are developed. Army technical intelligence support is
provided as close to the area of collection as
possible in order to accomplish this mission
(fig. 6).
b. The objectives of the strategic technical
intelligence effort are to(1) Determine capabilities, limitations,
and vulnerabilities of foreign technology, materiel, facilities, and installations.
(2) Exploit foreign technologies for the
benefit of the US forces.
(3) Assist in the development of effective
countermeasures by providing intelligence to the overall military research
and development effort.
(4) Provide materiel and information
upon which to base the training of all
armed forces personnel.

c. The principal producers of foreign intelligence within the Department of Defense are(1) Assistant Director for Scientific and
of
DIA
Technical
Intelligence
(DIAST).
(2) Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC).
(3) Missile
Intelligence
Directorate
(MID).
(4) Scientific and Technical Intelligence
AGO 6690A

Center (STIC) of the Department of
the Navy.
(5) Foreign Technology Division (FTD)
of the Air Force.
94. Role of DA Agencies

The Army Materiel Command, through its
subordinate agency known as the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC), is responsible for providing U.S. strategic planners,
the military research and development effort,
and the military technical/scientific effort with
timely and appropriate technical intelligence.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(ACSI), Department of the Army, has general
staff responsibility for all scientific and technical intelligence activities in the Army. Specifically, ACSI, DA, performs the following:
a. Formulates policies and procedures which
insure that scientific and technical intelligence
activities are carried out in the most efficient
and productive manner.
b. Supervises the preparation and execution
of the Army scientific and technical intelligence
program, in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and provides for its
integration into the Department of Defense
(DOD) Consolidated Intelligence Program
(CIP).

c. Coordinates requirements for technical
intelligence originated by the Department of
the Army staff and major subordinate commands to insure that they are fulfilled.
95. Strategic Procedures

a. A requirement for technical intelligence
can be levied by any agency within DOD. Frequently, however, a research and development
(R&D) activity or major CONUS command
47
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Note
A modified version is
included in Change 1,
which is included at the
end of this document.
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levies this requirement upon military intelligence resources.
b. Requirements are prepared by the Army

consumer using appropriate DA Forms for
Intelligence Production Requirements (IPR)
which are forwarded to ACSI, DA, for review.
The requirements are then forwarded to DIA
for final validation and are levied upon the appropriate oversea theater command. As requirements are satisfied, the information and/
or materiel are forwarded direct, or through
major oversea command channels, to CONUS.
Unless specific instructions to the contrary
are given by a Department of the Army agency,
all items for CONUS exploitation must be forwarded to the Foreign Technical Intelligence
Office (FTIO), Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland, in accordance with provisions of the
theater command. This office makes the deci-
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sion as to the CONUS site of full exploitation
to include the detailed plan concerning security
and disposition.

96. Strategic Dissemination
When the final technical intelligence reports
are produced, they are disseminated to various
consumers in accordance with previously requested statements of intelligence interest
(SII). . A continual feedback ~f information
from oversea producers to DIA and from DIA
and CONUS-producing units to the oversea
maj or commands is necessary if the entire
technical intelligence cycle is to be effective.
The distribution of technical information from
CONUS-producing units is made by DIA to the
oversea command to insure that military intelligence units are kept abreast of important
enemy technical and scientific trends and developments.
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APPENDIX II
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Major categories of technical intelligence
interest used for planning purposes(1) Science and Technology.
(a) Medical sciences.
(b) Physical sciences.
(c) Chemical sciences.
(d) Research and development.
(e) Materials.
(I) Military equipment production.
(g) Missiles and rockets.
(2) Nuclear.
(a) Nuclear materials.
(b) Weapons and munitions.
( c) Nuclear reactors.
(d) Nuclear power systems.
(e) Nuclear propulsion.
(3) Electronics.
(a) Radar.
(b) Computers.
(c) Communications.
(d) Reconnaissance and surveillance
equipment.
(e) Electronic countermeasures.
(I) Laser.
(g) Telemetry.
(h) Other.
(4) CB.
(a) CB agents.
(b) Weapons and munitions.
(c) CB defensive equipment.
(5) Ground Systems.
(a) Combat vehicles
(wheeled and
track).
(b) Support/logistical vehicles.
(c) Artillery.
(d) Air defense equipment.
(e) Infantry weapons.
(f) Ammunition, munitions, fuzes.
(g) Antitank equipment.
(h) Individual equipment and/or supplies.
(i) Special warfare weapons.
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(j) Maintenance equipment.

Amphibious equipment.
Camouflage equipment.
(m) Wire support equipment.
(n) Airborne equipment.
(0) Target acquisition equipment.
(6) Aerodynamic Systems.
(a) Bombers.
(b) Fighters,
(c) Drones.
(d) Helicopters.
(e) Reconnaissance aircraft.
(I) Other.
(7) Missiles.
(a) Aircraft-launched missiles.
(b) Ground-to-ground missiles.
1. Short-range missiles.
2. Intermediate range missiles.
3. Long-range missiles.
( c) Air defense missiles.
(d) Anti-tank missiles.
(e) Anti-missile missiles.
(I) Space systems.
(g) Submarine/ship-launched missiles.
(8) Sensor Equipment
(a) Optical.
( b) Acoustic.
(c) Radint.
(d) Photographic.
(e) EIint.
(f) Telemetry
(measuring devices)
laser.
(g) Other.
(9) Information Storage and Retrieval.
(a) Electronic data processing equipment.
(b) Document processing equipment.
(c) Manual equipment.
(d) Machine translation equipment.
(e) Real-time ADP equipment.
(I) Telemetry support equipment.
(g) Graphic display equipment.
(k)
(l)
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APPENDIX III
EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN

Copy No.
Thirtieth Army
HEIMERSHEIN, (595120) Germany
100930 July 10Appendix ______ to Annex ______ (Intelligence) to Operation Order.
1. General
a. References.
b. Purpose and scope.
c. Period covered.
d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans.
e. Priorities.
2. Organization
a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon).
(1) Organization.
(2) Functions.
(3) Subordinate agencies functions.
(4) Supporting agencies.
(5) Liaison and coordination.
b. A subparagraph for each combat service support technical
intelligence section as it relates to paragraph 2c.
(1) Weapons-munitions.
(2) Communication-electronics.
(3) Supply and equipment.
(4) Chemical.
(5) Mobility.
(6) Medical.
c. Each combat service support element should know the following:
(1) Mission.
(2) General organization.
(3) Functional team structure.
(4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel.
(5) Specific functions and responsibilities.
(6) Location of collection points at each echelon.
CLASSIFICATION
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(7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the
theater.
3. Personnel
a. Military policies concerning:
(1) Responsibilities of capturing unit.
(2) Handling captured enemy materiel.
(3) Handling abandoned equipment.
(4) Handling technical facilities and installations.
(5) Authority for destruction of captured materiel when
necessary.
(6) Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units.
(7) Technical intelligence collection team operations in forward areas.
(8) Preliminary examinations and analysis.
(9) Reports to be rendered.
(a) To tactical units.
(b) To technical intelligence company.
(10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence personnel.
(11) Equipment evacuation.
(12) Markings and tags.
h. Civilian
(1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military operations having a technical knowledge.
(2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups.
(3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel.
(4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge.
4. Direction
a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence
collection and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies).
b. Amplification of Items Wanted Lists.
c. Special technical intelligence targets.
d. Policies governing publishing requirements.
e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate
support elements (Le. FASCOM, General and Direct Support
Elements).
f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom
rendered.
g. Preparing EEl and other intelligence requirements.
h. Host-country agreement (if applicable).
5. Collections
a. Documents
(1) Procedures for collecting technical documents.
(2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents (see
appendix IV, STANAG 2084, FM 30-16).
(3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents.
CLASSIFICATION
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(4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of technical data.
(5) Handling of timely technical data.
(6) Channels for forwarding.
b. Prisoners
(1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowledge.
(2) Responsibilities of IPW personnel.
(3) Technical intelligence cooperation with IPW and combat
intelligence personnel.
(4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge.
(5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge.
(6) Channels for evacuation.
(7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees).
(8) Reports to be rendered.
c. Materiel
(1) Specific unit responsibilities.
(2) Examination policies.
(3) Evacuation channels.
(a) Primary.
(b) Alternate.
(4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a
target should be destroyed).
(5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment.
(6) Sensitive or classified equipment.
(7) Safeguarding.
(8) Marking.
(9) Ultimate disposition.
d. Facilities and Installations.
(1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting information.
(2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelligence interest.
(3) Channels for forwarding facilities data.
(4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data.
6. Processing
a. Records and/or files required to be maintained.
b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports.
(1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS).
(2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS).
c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical
intelligence company and other intelligence elements concerning evaluation and interpretation of technical information.
7. Dissemination
a. Scope.
b. Content.
c. Editorial assistance.
CLASSIFICATION
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d. Types of reports.
e. Special reports.
f. Policies governing dissemination.
8. Functional and Task Force Operations.
a. Theater and/or theater army policies.
b. Scope and priorities.
c. Effort that may be expended on missions.
d. Additional support sources if needed.
e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data.
f. Responsibilities for direction of operations.
g. Limitations on units and individuals.
h. Security.
i. Safeguarding components of intelligence value.
j. Host-country agreement.
JONES

General
Distribution: C
OFFICIAL
/s/ S.S.SMITH
Smith
G2
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APPENDIX IV
STANAG 2084-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

(Editorial note: STANAG 2084-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED
ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT, dated 22 June 1962, also adopted as
SOLOG 94, is a primary concern in this field manual. Normally, the Details of Agreement (DofA) which appear in this STANAG would have been reproduced in this
appendix, and remain valid until such time as the STANAG is officially withdrawn or
revised. However, this procedure has not been followed in this instance because the
U. S. Armed Forces (and other NATO members) have developed and concurred in a
revision of STANAG 2084 which has been recommended to the Army Board, Military
Agency for Standardization, NATO, for promulgation as STANAG 2084 (Edition No.
2)-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND
DOCUMENTS. It is anticipated that the revised STANAG will be promulgated approximately in April 1966; therefore, the DofA of the revised STANAG (subject to
minor editorial changes which may appear in the published text of Edition No.2) have
been selected for the appendix of this field manual in lieu of the DofA which they will
soon replace. It is also to be noted that the descriptive title of STANAG 2084 (Edition
No.2) has been changed to agree with the sequence followed in the DofA).

STANAG 2084 (Edition No.2) HANDLING AND REPORTING OF
CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS
(Adopted as SOLOG 94)
DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA)
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY
EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS
Enclosures: Annex
Annex
Annex
Annex
Annex
Annex

A (DofA)-Types of Captured Enemy Equipment
B (DofA)-PRETECHREP
C (DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE A
D (DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE B
E (DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE C
F (DofA)-Technical Intelligence Teams

AGREEMENT
1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will use the procedure
detailed in Part I for the handling of captured enemy equipment and associated technical documents and in Part II for handling captured enemy
documents. It is further agreed to use the item list of equipment and the
description and procedure for these reports in Annexes A-F (DofA).
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice any national right on the equipment proper.
DEFINITIONS
1. Document
Any recorded information regardless of its physical form of characteristics includes, but is not limited to, the following: All written mateAGO 5590A
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rial, whether handwritten or printed or typed; all painted, drawn or
engraved material; all sound or voice recordings; all printed photographs
and exposed or printed film, still or motion picture; and all reproductions
of the foregoing, by whatever process produced.
PART I
HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND
ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS
GENERAL
2. Captured enemy equipment (CEE) and associated technical documents will be handled for exploitation with the minimum delay through the
following processing channels:
a. Preliminary screening and reporting for information of immediate tactical value by national units assigned to NATO.
b. Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special
intelligence support teams (Technical Intelligence Teams).
c. Detailed exploitation by specialists in the rear areas.
Note. A detailed list of the types of CEE to be processed is given in Annex A
(DofA).

3. The technical intelligence report;s and documents considered are:
a. Preliminary Technical Reports (PRETECHREP) (submitted
by the capturing Unit). Annex B (DofA).
b. Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP) (submitted by Technical Intelligence Teams). Annex B (DofA).
c. Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by specialists as appropriate).
d. Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals, Drawings, etc.).
4. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should
be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment for
the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists
for a permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be
set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to:
a. Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Technical Reports.
b. Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical
Reports.
c. Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base
or to the captured equipments depot (which are to be established at a
minimum of one per Army Group).
d. Liaison with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units.
e. Insure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined
as soon as interrogation units have finished with the items concerned. Full
use should be made of voluntary information which the PW may give.
(See STANAG 2033 (Edition No.2).)
Note. Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which, according to
Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must be left with the PW,
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b. Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special
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4. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should
be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment for
the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists
for a permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be
set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to:
a. Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Technical Reports.
b. Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical
Reports.
c. Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base
or to the captured equipments depot (which are to be established at a
minimum of one per Army Group).
d. Liaison with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units.
e. Insure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined
as soon as interrogation units have finished with the items concerned. Full
use should be made of voluntary information which the PW may give.
(See STANAG 2033 (Edition No.2).)
Note. Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which, according to
Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must be left with the PW,
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must be replaced by equivalent items serving the same purpose (See STANAG 2044
(Edition No.2).)

f. Receive from intelligence channels all copies of technical documents which may assist them in their examination.
5. Technical Intelligence Teams should as far as possible be independent, or organic to the units earmarked or assigned to NATO and be
sufficiently flexible to cater for a variety and number of equipments. They
will need to be equipped with suitable tools, transport and facilities for
compiling and sending their reports from the field. Suggested allocation
for these teams is given at Annex F (DofA).
6. Specialist Teams are required to carry out the more detailed examination of captured enemy equipments to supplement the more superficial
data which can be obtained in the field. Such teams should be in a position
after their examination to render the Detailed Technical Report. No suggested allocation is given for these teams as they will depend on national
resources available.
HANDLING OF CEE BY CAPTURING UNIT
7. Units locating enemy equipment of intelligence value will submit
the Preliminary Technical Report given at Annex B (DofA). This report
will be transmitted by the accelerated intelligence reporting procedures
when it contains intelligence information which could have an immediate
effect upon the current situation. Reports not containing such information
will be transmitted by the quickest possible means with the precedence
as determined by the commander initiating the report. These reports will
contain a general description of the equipment and any technical information of immediate tactical importance.
8. Unit Commanders will be responsible for placing the captured
enemy equipment under guard in order to prevent looting, misuse or
destruction before the arrival of the Technical Intelligence Field Teams.
9. All technical documents will be clearly tagged or otherwise identified so as to avoid defacing and marked "TECHDOC" by the capturing
unit or appropriate agency. In the normal exploitation of capt!lred ctO(;U
ments the Command concerned can provide duplicate copies for the guidance of all Technical Intelligence and Specialist Teams in their examinations. All such copies should accompany captured equipment until technical
exploitation is finalized.
10. The command concerned will notify the appropriate Technical
Intelligence Team, which will arrange to examine the CEE, either on the
spot or nearby where better field facilities may exist. (See Annex
F(DofA).)
11. Having completed the field examination, the relevant parts of
the Complementary Report will be completed and sent through normal
staff channels. The description of such equipment and any additional information of tactical value as can be extracted will be sent directly to such
headquarters as specified by NATO Authorities. The formats of these
reports are given in Annexes C, D and E (DofA).
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HANDLING OF CEE FOR SPECIALISTS
12. Arrangements should then be made for the speedy evacuation
of the equipment to the rear areas where suitable facilities exist for a
detailed examination of the equipment by specialists.
13. This will enable the completion of a Detailed Technical Report.
No illustration is given of this type of report in view of the great variety
of equipments involved. It should, however, follow the pattern already
used by national technical exploitation agencies. Such reports will be submitted as soon as possible by specialists through the same channels as
those laid down for Complementary Reports. If directed, national intelligence agencies should also be informed after either the Complementary
or the Detailed Technical Reports have been forwarded.
14. In the case where the capturing nation is not in a position to
conduct an exhaustive field or rear area exploitation of the equipment, the
appropriate NATO authority will advise the capturing nation as to further
action. In these cases, the exploitation agency should inform the capturing
nation of the results of that exploitation.
PART II
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED
ENEMY DOCUMENTS
GENERAL
15. Captured enemy documents (CED), except those belonging to
CEE (TECHDOC) or reproductions thereof, will be forwarded for exploitation to the appropriate "Captured Document Center." These centers will
be, as a rule, organic to Major NATO Commands. Captured documents
will be sent with the minimum delay through the following processing
channels:
a. National units assigned to NATO for preliminary screening for
information of immediate tactical value.
b. Special Intelligence Support Teams for CED for secondary
screening, reproductions and dissemination to all concerned.
c. USACDC for detailed exploitation and indexing.
16. Captured documents will be divided as follows:
a. Category "A." Category "A" documents are those which contain information concerning significant intelligence subjects, such as
enemy order of battle, the employment of new weapons and equipment
by the enemy, his logistic situation, (Stock levels, shortage, supply systems, especially supply systems for missiles) his morale, his losses, etc.
Such documents require immediate operational exploitation, and the originals or microfilm copies must reach appropriate operational intelligence
staffs at the earliest possible moment.
b. Category "E." Category "B" documents are cryptographic documents, all encrypted items and all documents relating to enemy radio systems. These documents must reach the appropriate intelligence staffs at the
earliest possible moment.
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c. Category "C." Category "c" documents are those of lesser intelligence value.
d. Category "D." Category "D" documents are those which contain
no information of intelligence value.
HANDLING OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS BY
THE CAPTURING UNIT
17. Captured documents will be forwarded without delay by the capturing unit to the staff under which the unit is operating, with details of
the date, time and place of capture (with map coordinates), together with
the name of the capturing unit and the circumstances under which the
documents were found.
18. Documents will be clearly tagged, or otherwise identified so as
to avoid defacing, by the capturing unit in the following way:
a. Identification Letters. Documents will be tagged showing the
nationality of the capturing force by the national identifying letters prescribed in STANAG 1059.
b. Designation of Capturing Units. This will include the service
to which the unit belongs.
c. Serial Number. Units will give each document a serial number
and should record the dispatch of the document in a war diary.
d. Date/Time of capture.
e. Place of capture (with map coordinates).
f. Summary of circumstances under which the document was found.
19. In cases, where documents are discovered by personnel of NATO
staffs and units, and not by national forces assigned to or earmarked for
NATO, then the identification letters to be used will be "NA." Other instructions in paragraph 18, however, will apply.
20. Whenever intelligence derived from a captured document is included in a unit or information intelligence report, the identification letters and number of the document concerned will be quoted to avoid subsequent false confirmation.
HANDLING OF CED BY INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS
21. All captured documents will be categorized and forwarded. The
detailed procedures for handling captured documents will include the following main tasks:
a. Screening.
b. Recording
c. Translation.
d. Reproduction.
e. Dissemination.
22. Intelligence staffs will insure that there is no delay in the exploitation of captured documents. If for any reason, qualified personnel or
microfilming facilities are temporarily not available or are insufficient
to handle the volume or type of documents concerned, the documents
AGO 5590A
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will be forwarded immediately to the next higher echelon and will not
be retained by the staff in question.
23. The staff concerned will handle the documents in one of the
following ways:
a. Category "A."
(1) Where microfilming facilities exist, they will photograph
documents with attached comments, and forward original documents direct to either the national agency or the appropriate NATO Intelligence
Support Unit for exploitation, by-passing intermediate headquarters.
Where suitable linguists are available, microfilms will be examined for
information of tactical value to local commanders.
(2) Where microfilming facilities do not exist, but suitable linguists are available, they will examine documents for information of tactical value to local commanders, attach appropriate comments, and forward without delay to the appropriate higher headquarters.
(3) Where linguists are not available within the formation headquarters, the documents should go to the PW interrogators for evaluation.
b. Category "B." These will be forwarded without delay to the
Naval, Army, or Air Force headquarters which are primarily interested.
The NATO international headquarters under which the capturing unit
operates should be informed of the capture and disposition of important
documents in this category as soon as possible.
c. Category "C." The staff concerned will forward Category "C"
documents direct to the appropriate NATO Intelligence Support Unit for
exploitation. Exceptions to this procedure include:
(1) Unmarked maps and charts of previously unknown types
which will be forwarded to the nearest engineer unit or topographical
section.
(2) Personal mail and pay books taken from a PW, which will
be returned to the PW after exploitation by interrogation personnel or
intelligence staffs.
(3) Other documents acquired from a PW which, after they
have served their purpose in interrogation, will be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence staff for further exploitation.
(4) Documents specifically related to equipment which will, if
of intelligence value, accompany the equipment to the intelligence agency
responsible for exploitation and then will be sent without delay to the
captured document center.
d. Category "D." Captured documents will not become final as
Category "D" until they have been thoroughly analyzed by document
translation specialists at the highest command echelon interested, preferably at least two levels above division. Category "D" documents will be
disposed of as directed by appropriate authority.
24. Documents of the Categories "A," "B," "C," and "D" captured
from crashed enemy aircraft or, in particular, related to enemy antiaircraft defense or enemy control and reporting systems, will be transmitted to the nearest Air Force headquarters without delay. The same
procedure applies to all captured maps and charts of enemy air forces.
After evaluation by the responsible Air Force intelligence staff they will
be transmitted to the topographical or other appropriate unit. Documents
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taken from a ship, including Category "B" code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, etc., should be forwarded without
delay to the nearest naval force headquarters.
25. As a general rule, Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals
and drawings should accompany the captured equipment until the intelligence exploitation is completed.
HANDLING OF CED BY THE
CAPTURED DOCUMENT CENTER (CDC)
26. Lists of documents which have been exploited will be distributed
to all intelligence staffs by the CDC to avoid duplication in translating
and processing identical documents by different units. A master list of
all captured documents which have be~n exploited in NATO commands
will be maintained.
27. When action on captured documents at CDC has been completed,
the original documents will be sent to the national staff whose forces
captured them.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
28. This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when
the necessary orders/instructions putting the procedures detailed in this
Agreement into effect have been issued to the forces concerned.
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Annex A (DofA) STANAG
2084 (Edition No.2)
TYPES OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT
Types of enemy equipment to be collected and examined by Technical
Intelligence Teams. (New equipment or equipment in the process of development ("significant equipment") will be the main concern of these
teams.)
COMTECHREP
1. Army Equipment.
a. Guided missiles.
b. Ammunition, all types including mines, demolitions,
pyrotechnics and chemical.
c. Infantry weapons.
d. Sabotage equipment.
e. Armored fighting vehicles (AFV's)
Type B
f. Military vehicles excluding AFV's.
>See Annex
g. Artillery, including anti-tank, anti-aircraft and field D (DofA)
rocket weapons.
h. Guided missile launching systems.
i. Engineering, amphibious and river crossing
j. Electronics, infra-red detection and communication
equipment.

J

k. Airborne equipment.
I. Special weapons, including nuclear, biological and
chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary
weapons, equipment for dispersion of chemical and
biological warfare agents, together with protective )[Type C
devices.
See Annex
m. Miscellaneous equipments:
E(DofA)
(1) Camouflage equipment.
(2) Clothing and personal equipment.
(3) Medical equipment.
(4) Rations.

I

2. Air Force Equipment.
)
a. Aircraft, airframe and power plant.
b. Airborne, armament and ammunition, bomb sights,
gun sights and photographic equipment.
c. Airborne radio and electrical equipment.
d. Miscellaneous airborne equipment, including instruments and controls, dinghies, parachute and other
safety equipment.
e. Ground equipment and installations.
f. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants.
g. Guided missiles and associated equipment.
h. Equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents.
i. Miscellaneous equipments:
(1) Flying clothing equipment, including G-suits,
pressure breathing equipment, etc.
(2) Medical equipments and flying rations.
J
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3. Navy Equipment.
a. Ships.
b. Missiles and launching systems.
c. Shipboard ordnance, including guns, fire control equipment, i.e.,
radars, range finders, stable elements, range keepers, spotters' telescopes,
gun mounts and turrets, ammunition hoists, rammers, fuzes, fuze setters,
recoil mechanisms, weapons of all types including Hedgehogs, Mousetraps,
Weapon "A" equivalents, Limbo types, depth charge racks and "Y" and
"K" gun launchers; torpedoes and torpedo tubes; including ASW launchers; rockets and rocket launchers.
d. Sea mines of all types, including moored, bottom and floating;
contact and influence.
e. Harbour defense equipment including nets, booms, alerting devices, net tenders.
f. Navy electronics, infra-red, detection and communication equipment, sonars, fathometers and sonobuoys.
g. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants.
h. Special weapons, including chemical warfare equipment, flame
and incendiary equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices such as clothing, gas masks
and canisters; salt water spray deck washing equipment for protection.
i. Medical supplies and medical instruments.
j. Demolition and sabotage equipment, underwater demolition team
(UDT) equipment (sleds, masks, etc.).

k. Naval engineering systems, including: main propulsion machinery, steam or gas turbines, boilers, diesel engines, auxiliary equipment including motor generators, heat exchangers, pumps, evaporators, fuel oil
systems for boilers and diesel engines, including fuel pumps and fuel oil
heaters; pressure gauges, boiler accessories including safety valves, steam
control valves, gauge glasses, feed water check valves, propellers, hull
zincs, refrigerating machinery, submarine storage batteries and their ventilating equipment, ammeters, voltmeters, amp/hr meters; steering engines, engine room telegraph systems, submerged atmospheric gas analyzers, CO 2 scrubbers, compressors, and ships underwater logs; samples
of metals used in shipbuilding and any information (description) of welding technique used in shipbuilding.
1. Hydrofoil and hovercraft, small boats and boat handling equipment, life rafts and signal apparatus or any of their components such as
as hydrofoil foils.

m. Anchors, chains, windlasses, winches, fueling and transfer at
sea rigs, and cargo handling gear.
n. Hydrographic survey ships equipment including high altitude
research rockets and their launching equipment, sonars and fathometers,
sea bottoms ampling gear such as drags and coring equipment, deep sea
anchors, sea current measuring devices, biological sampling equipment,
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N ansen bottles, possible helicopters and other equipment such as laboratory instruments.
Notes.
(1) Although cryptographic material is not specifically mentioned in the above
lists, technical intelligence teams will also be responsible for the collection of such
material. Special instructions for the handling of this equipment will be issued by the
appropriate NATO command.
(2) Where no requirement exists for permanent Naval Technical Intelligence
Teams, such groups may be set upon an ad hoc basis.
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Annex B (DofA) to STANAG
2084 (Edition No.2)
PRETECHREP
To be submitted by accelerated intelligence reporting procedures immediately following the acquisition of significant enemy equipment (see
paragraph 7 (DofA).)

A. Date found, location (map reference).
B. Type of equipment and quantity.
C. Origin.
D. Brief description with distinguishing marks.
E. Technical characteristics with an immediate value.
F. Signature of the commander of capturing unit.
G. Time and origin of the message.

AGO 5590A.
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Annex C(DofA) to STANAG
2084 (Edition No.2)
COMTECHREP-TYPE A
To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following
initial examination of enemy aircraft.

A. Date and location of crash and map of reference.
B. Type of aircraft and:
(1) Overall length.
(2) Overall wing-span.
C. Identification and distinguishing marks.
D. Type of engine(s) and condition.
E. Cause of Crash; number, location and caliber of projectile
strikes; condition of aircraft.
F. Armament:
(1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity.
(2) Ammunition and number of magazines.
(3) Bombs and bomb installations.
(4) Mines and mine carriers.
(5) Rocket projectiles and carriers.
(6) Pyrotechnics, number and type.
G. Armour plate; quantity, positions, thickness, strikes,
penetrations.
H. Number of crew and fate.
1. Wings and control surfaces, leading edge, of protected against
balloon cables by cutters, strengthening or other special devices;
de-icing.
J. State if samples are obtainable of:
(1) Gasoline.
(2) Oil.
(3) Coolant.
(4) Hydraulic fluids.
(5) De-icing fluids.
K. Internal equipment; state condition arid whether bombsights,
radio, photographic equipment and electronics equipment and
instruments are standard. If not, specify modifications, alterations or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible.
L. Landing gear; type and condition.
M. General remarks and special points or unusual features not
mentioned.
N. Name plates photographed:
( 1 ) Airframe.
(2) Engine.
(3) Others.
O. Other information.
P. Name of officer in Command of Technical Intelligence Team
making examination.
Q. Time and origin of message.
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Annex D (DofA) to STAN AG
2084 (Edition No.2)
COMTECHREP-TYPE B
1. COMTECHREP TYPE B is used for reporting information about
ammunition, missiles, bombs, shells, rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes,
etc.

2. To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination.
3. Only use those letters for which information is available.
A. Nationality, designation and mark number.
B. Description.
C. Overall length of missile, including fuze, tail, vanes and fittings.
D. Maximum diameter of missiles.
E. Shape and design of Inissiles (streamlining shells),
F. Length and width of tail.
G. Span of vanes.
H. Thickness of casing at nose.

1. Thickness of casing at sides.
J. Thickness of casing at base.
K. Material of body.
L. Material of tail or vanes.
M. Colour and marking of nose.
N. Colour and marking of body.
O. Colour and marking of tailor vanes.
P. Weight and nature of main filling.
Q. Total weight of missile.

R. Method of suspension.
S. Detonation system.
T. Fusing systems and markings.
U. Anti-handling or booby trap devices.
V. Method of propulsion.
W. Date and location of lTIissile.
X. Other information.
Y. Name of officer in command of the Technical Intelligence Team
making examination.
X. Time and origin of message.
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Annex E(DofA) to STANAG
2084 (Edition No.2)
COMTECHREP-TYPE C
To be submitted within 72 hours following the acquisition of an item
of captured equipment not covered under Types A and B.

A. Date found, location (map reference).
B. Type of equipment and quantity.
C. Origin.
D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details).
E. Conditions of equipment.
F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional details).
G. Recommended disposal.
H. Name plates photographed.
I. Photographs taken.

J. Other information.
K. Name of chief of team.
L. Time and origin of message.

70

AGO

5~OA

Annex F(DofA) to STANAG
2084 (Edition No.2)
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS
1. Army and air teams should be provided by national forces assigned
to NATO on the following minimum bases:
a. Where forces concerned are operating on one front or on a
peninsula (Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece): two army and two air
teams.
b. Where forces concerned are operating on two fronts on a peninsula (Turkey): two army and two air teams per front.
2. See paragraph 4 (DofA), regarding naval teams.
3. It is recognized that as these teams will be furnished on a national
basis, their composition will be partly determined by national characteristics. However, the following composition of army and air teams is suggested as a standard in order to give adequate technical intelligence support to the fighting forces:
a. Air Team.
(1) Airframe-engine equipment.
(2) Armament.
(3) Radio-electronics.
(4) Administrative-photos, reports, transport and equipment.
(5) Guided missile ordnance.
b. Army Team.
(1) Vehicles, tanks.
(2) Engineering equipment.
(3) Armament.
( 4) Radio-electronics.
(5) Guided-missile ordnance.
(6) Administrative.
(7) Nuclear-biological-chemical specialist.
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APPENDIX V
STANAG 2097-NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET BLOC ARMY
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA)
NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT
Enclosure: Annex "A" (DofA)-Titles of Groups of Weapons and
Equipment.
GENERAL
1. The NATO Armed Forces agree to use the nomenclature of the
country of origin for Soviet Bloc Army weapons, equipment and vehicles
whenever this nomenclature is known.

2. When the nomenclature of the country of origin is NOT known a
short descriptive title will be devised and used as an interim measure only.
3. These short interim title will be issued by SHAPE as soon as possible after the sighting details have been received from national/NATO
sources. When reporting new items to SHAPE national/NATO sources
should suggest a possible interim title, formulated as detailed in the subsequent paragraphs. Interim titles should:
a. Include the country of design and manufacture (where this is
different from the country of design) or the best intelligence
estimate thereof.
b. Include a question mark after the country name when appropriate.
c. Become progressively more specific, e.g.
(1) E. German (?) Hand Grenade M 1960.
(2) E. German copy of Sov Hand Grenade M 1960.
(3) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade M 1960.
(4) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade A.KG-3.
When the manner in which information was obtained clearly warrants
protection of a confidential source or method, the NATO country providing the information will assign a security classification which will remain
binding on all recipients until the classification is removed by the originating authority.
DESCRIPTION
5. The nomenclature for any given piece of equipment will include
an adequate description to show:
a. the role of the equipment, e.g., medium tank, howitzer, antitank
gun;
b. type of chassis where applicable (assumed to be wheeled unless
otherwise stated), e.g., halftracked, tracked.
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WEAPON CALIBERS
6. The caliber of all weapons will be referred to in millimeters and
will always be placed immediately preceding the description of the weapon.
7. The abbreviation "mm" for millimeters will always be used.

DATE OF FIRST SIGHTING OR EVIDENCE OF EXISTENCE
8. The year when the equipment was first seen or known to exist will
be indicated by the use of the letter M and the four figures of the year.
These figures will become part of the title, e.g., 100 mm Field Gun M 1964.
9. It is possible that more than one new equipment of a similar type
may be sighted in anyone year. To distinguish between the various types
a numerical suffix will be applied to the sighting date, e.g., M 1962/1,
M 1962/2, M 1962/3.
EXAMPLES OF TITLES
10. The items to be included in the title of each group of weapons
and equipment, and examples of these titles, are shown at Annex "A"
(DofA).
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Annex "A" (DofA) to
STANAG 2097
TITLES OF GROUPS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
COUNTRY OF ORIGINType of Equipment

Items in Title

Small Arms
Infantry anti-aircraft (AA) Weapons
Infantry anti-tank (AT) Weapons

Caliber
Description
Sighting year

Hand Grenades

If anti-tank

Examples

7.62mm Pistol M 1964
12.7mm AA Machinegun M 7963
82mm AT Launcher M 1964
(AT)

Sighting year

Hand Grenades M 1964
A T Hand Grenades M 1964

Artillery

Caliber
Description
If Self-propelled (SP)
Sighting year

100mm Field Gun M 1964
152mm SP Gun M 1965

Rocket Launchers

Caliber
Description
Number of rounds
Sighting year

240mm Rocket Launcher (16-round)
M 1964
One Round Rocket Launcher M 1964

Weight class

Medium Tank M 1964
Light Amphibious Tank M 1964

Tanks

If amphibious

Sighting year
Armored Personnel Carriers

If amphibious
If tracked or half-tracked.

APC M 1964
Amphibious Tracked APC M 1964

Sighting year
Assault Guns (SU's)

Description
Caliber (without mm)
Sighting year

SU-I00 M 1964

Soft Skinned Vehicles including
wheeled amphibians

If amphibious
If tracked

Truck, 4x2 M 1964
Amphibious Truck, 4x4 M 1965
Tracked Amphibian M 1964

Description
Type of drive (wheels)
Sighting year
Engineer Equipment

Description
Sighting year

Trencher M 1964
Pontoon M 1964

Radars

Description and Type
Sighting year

Tactical Control SAM Radar M 1964
Surveillance Field Radar M 1964
Fire Control Anti-Aircraft Radar M 1964

Missiles

Role
Sighting year

SSM 1964
SAM 1964
(Use STANAG 3236 when applicable)
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FM 30-16
C 1

HE'ADQU.A..RTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARl\fY
'VASHINGTOX, D.C., 15 Jrune 1967

CHANGE)'

No.1

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
FJ\I30-16, 19 Septelnber 1966, is changed as follows:
Page 3, paragraph 1a. Line 6 is changed to read
"nonnuclear warfare and in chemical, bioloO'ical
I!l
,
· 1 .
I'a d10 oglca], and internal defense environments.
It covers procedures and."
Page 8, paragraph 2b (2). In line 19 "internal
clefense~' is changed to read "stability."
Page 4. Paragraph 5d is superseded as follows:
d. Provide information ,yhich enables U.S.
forces to use foreign material and facilities.
Page 4~ paragraph 5n. Line 1 is changed to read
"Provide the technical intelligence aspects for
tactical and strategic studies on."
Page 6, paragraph 9a. In line 4, "intelliO'ence
within" is changed to read "intelligence m~sion
within." The last sentence is deleted.
Page 6, paragraph 9b. In line 5, "with" is
changed to read "bet,Yeen."
Page 6. Paragraph 90 is rescinded.
Pagers 6 and 9, paragraph 10. Subparagraphs a~
b, and 0 are redesignated as b, 0, and d and subparagraph a is added as follows:
a. The technical intelligence company is capable
of providing necessary technical intelligence support to corps and divisions assigned to the field
army. In addition, it is a flexible oro'anization
readily adaptable to the integration of technical
intelligence activities of other services and can be
integrated into a joint or unified command intelligence effort in all type-s of ,Yarfare. The technical intelligence company is completely airtransportable; however, it is only 50 percent ground
mobile using organic vehicles.
Page 9~ paragraph 12b (3). Line 8 is changed to
read "biological, and radiological defense materiel."
Page 10, paragraph 120(3) (I). In lines 8 and
9, "miscellaneous" is changed to read "general."
. Page 1B, paragraph 14a. In line 2, "equipment"
IS changed to read "intelligence."
Page 13. Paragraph 14g (12) is added as follows;
1'.:\GO lA--July
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(12) Communications equipment modules.
Page 16. Paragraph 22a. is superseded as follmys;
a. The scope of mobility intelligence is comprehensiye. It covers most aspects of engineer and
transportation actiyity at all echelons of the
enemy's military organization. Engineer and
transportcltion support has become increasingly
important in all types of military operations due
to the increasing nse of engineer and transportation equipment by supply anel transport agencies
of all armies.
Page 16, paTagraph 22b. In line 3, after "tactical technical intelligence." the following is added
"See FJ\i 30-5 for a discussion of the interrelationship of tactical and strategic intelligence."
Page 16, paragraph 220. In lines 9 and 10, the
words "structures, facilities, and manmade objects
such as," are deleted.
Page 17. Paragraph 24a is superseded as f01lmys:
(t. :.afedical intelligence is that cateO'ol'V of intel•
b
J
hgence ,yhich concerns itself with man as a living
organism and those factors which affect his efficiency, capability, and well-being. Although medical intelligence is a functional entity and should
not be fragmented, strategic requirements indicate
the need for intelligence concerning foreign Inedical technical deyelopments, performance, and operational capabilities.
Page 17. Paragraph 24a..1 is added as follows:
a.1. l\Iedical technical intelligence is not primar~
ily materiel-oriented. Examination, evaluation,
and classification of medical materiel are only seglllents of the total medical technical intelligence
effort. If possible, medical intelligence must retain integrity so that the end product will include
all available information a-ffeeting the health and
weHare of men and animals in actual or possible
areas of military operation which is immediately
or potentially significant. Snch information IS
1

vital in both strategic and tactical planning and
may influence military operations.
Page 17, paragraph 25c. In line 2, "deflectors'~
is changed to read "defectors.~'
Pa.ge 18. Paragraph 27 g is rescinded.
Page 19~ paragraph 29a. In lines 15 ancl16, the
sentence "The initiation of CBR operations can
change the entire course of a wnr.:~ is deleted.
Page 19, paragraph 30. Subparagraphs c and c
a,re snperseded and Ii is added as follows:
c. Preparing and forwarding samples of biological agents to medical laboratory personnel for
identification.
e. ~rnintaining liaison ,,,ith the general chemical laboratory.
Ii. 4\nalyzing and identifying enemy-delivered.
chemical agents within the limitations of the eBR
agent sampling and analyzing kit.
Page it). Paragraph in is superseded as follows:

31. Additional Capability
Chemical persollnel have the additional capability of collecting CBR samples following enemy
attack for cleli,'ery to the supporting general
chemical laboratory (for an~lysis. and identification of chemical and radiological agents), and to
the supporting medical service laboratory (fol'
identification of biological agents).
Page 91. Paragraph 37b (9) is added as follows:
(9) Engineer topographic units and terrain
teams.

Page :32, paragraph 38b. In lines 1 through 3,
first. sentence is superseded as follows:
b. Frequently, many priority technical intelligence collection requirements will be generated by
intelligence collection progrmns established at national and Department of Defense levels. These
programs include priorit.y requirements for certain items of enemy equipment and materiel. Such
requirements normally will be distributed to U.S.
Army collection agencies in the form of Items
,YantedLists (I'VL).
Page g2~ paragraph i39a. In line 16, after "obtained/' the following is added "This is especially
important concerning documents relating to
enemy C0l1111lUllications-electronics systems, for
example: code books, call signs, frequency tables,
signal operating instructions (SOl), standing signa.] instructions (SSI), cryptography and encrypted items.~'
2

Page 22. Paragraph 39c is superseded as
follows:
c. Oorps Technical Intelligence Oollcction
TeanM. These teams are trained to collect and
search for tactic-al information on foreign materiel, facilities, methods, techniques, and technical activities. Technical intelligence augmentation
teams (TOE 30-600), assigned to the technical intelligence company, will be placed in direct support of the various corps elements, and will contact frontline tactical elements for collection of
Inateriel. Technical ~ntelligence teams assist primarily in carrying out the technical intelligence
collection tesponsibilities of the corps.
Page 2.4. Paragraph 43 is superseded as follows:

43. Collecting Points
Collecting points are facilities to which captured or abandoned foreign materiel is evacuated
for temporary storage anel proper disposition in
accordance with technical intelligence requirements. Collecting points operate, where needed,
throughout the theater of operations for the classification, segregation, disassembly, and disposition
of serviceable and unserviceable foreign materiel
in accordance ,yith guidance and instructions provided by the field army commander. In the division areas, 11laintenance. or salvage collecting
points operated by division support command
units, normally are designated to receive captured
or abandoned foreign materiel (F~f 29-22). In
the field army area and CO~fM:Z, the collecting
points are normally those operated by the Collection and Classification Compauy (TOE 29-139).
Evacuation flow through collecting points is as
sho'wn in figure 3.
Page 26. ParagralJh 44e is rescinded.
Page 30, paragraph 49a. In the first sentence
"expertise" is changed to read "proficiency."
Page 3:3, paragraph 55([,. In line 6 "expertise'~ is
changed to read "proficiency."
Page 34. Paragraph 60 is superseded as follows:

60. Combined Operation Reports
Appendix V outlines current N ATO-standardized nomenclature as prescribed by STANAG
2097. ,Vhell possible, all teehnical intelligence report. nomenclature should be NATO-standardized
and should be in consonance with overall unified/
joint/theater policies and guidance.
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Page 37, paragraph 67b. In line 9, Hpersonnel"
is changed to read ", chemical laboratory, or medical laboratory personnel"
Page 40. Paragraph 78c(1) is superseded as
follows:
(1) Ci viliau technicians-engineers, architeets, chemists, physicists, and communications-electronics specialists.
Page 41. Chapter 8, the title is changed to read
"STABILITY OPERATIONS."
Page 41, paragraph 79a. In lines 2 and 3 "internal defense development assistance operations" is
changed to read "stability operations."
Page 41, paragraph 79b. In line 11 "internal
defense~' is changed to read "stability."
Page 41, paragraph 79d. In line 9 "will" is
changed to read "with."
Page 493, paragraph 81. In line 1 "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."
Page 4:2, paragraph 84a. In lines 2 and 3 "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."
Page '.1;;3, paragraph 84b. In line 5 "propellants,
and petroleum products." is changed ~o read "propellents, communications-electronics equipment,
and petroleum products."
Page 44, paragraph 88. The title is changed to
read "Strike Operations."
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Paragraph 88a. The first sentence is changed
to read "An important characteristic of stability
operations is the extensive use of strike operations.
These operations are offensive in nature and include reconnaissance in force, raids, coordinated
attacks, and search and destroy and search and
clear operatiops. Strike operations are tenninated
by 'withdrawal fronl the operational area upon mission accOlnplishnlent; the holding of terrain is not
emphasized."
.
Page 44. Paragraph 88b(9) (e) is superseded
as follo"\ys:
(e) Assessment of Inedical standards.
Page 45.. Paragraph 90. In line 1 "internal deis changed to read "stahility."
Page 417. Paragra ph 93c (.3.1) is added as
follows:
(3.1) l\fedical Intelligence Officer.
Page 4'7, paragraph 94. After line 7, the following sentence is added:
The functions of the Army l\Iedical Intelligence
Officer are to direct the A:NIEDS intelligence program, and to deyelop and administer those nledical intelligence activities, to include collecting
and producing Inedical scientific and technical intelligence, for which the Surgeon General is
responsible.
Page 48. Figure 6 is superseded as follo"\vs:
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Page 50, appendix I. The following are added to
the list of references in proper numerical order:
:fM 19-2, !Iilitary Support in the Field
Army.
FM 31-73, Advisor Handbook for Stability
Operations.
The following changes are nlade to indicate
classification:
(S) F!1 3-10A, Employment of Biological
Agents (U).
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

OfJicial:
KENNETH G. 1VICKHAM:,
Major Genel'al, United States A1 my,
The Adjutant General.

(C) F!1 3-10B, Employment of Chemical
Agents (U).
FM 11-30 is deleted.
Page 52, a,ppendix II. After category (5) (0)
the following are added:
(p) Construction equipment.
(q) Mine warfare equipment.
(1') Bridging.
(s) Psychological warfare equipment.

HAROLD I{' JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Ohief of Staff·
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